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Abstract
Few views are as widely held as the Standard View of Identity. Here I am concerned
with minority views that depart from the standard account. First, I attempt to
illuminate such views and the debates concerning them by identifying the principles
of identity at issue, articulating some of the assumptions underlying the debates, and
presenting some of the evidence used against the Standard View of Identity. Second,
I enter two of these debates myself. I first defend two Non-Standard Views of Identity
from the charge that they violate a principle of identity, namely the Transitivity of
Identity. I then present an overlooked consequence of another Non-Standard View of
Identity that challenges the view on one of its own methodological principles. Third,
I draw on recent work in ontological and parthood pluralism to show how one might
be led to think that there is more than one way of being identical. That is, I show
how one might be an identity pluralist.
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A relation [of identity] would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself,
and indeed one in which each thing stands to itself but to no other thing.
(Frege 1892b, p. 26)
What more can be said of identity than this? I contend that much more can. In
fact, before articulating this now famous slogan, Gottlob Frege wrote
[Identity] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy
to answer. (Frege 1892b, p. 26)1
While he might not have anticipated the questions explored here, I think Frege
was right to suggest that there are many difficult questions regarding the identity
relation.
Here, I contribute to debates concerning identity in several ways. In this chapter,
because such debates tend to focus on the merits of particular views, I provide some
generalizations of these debates that illuminate their common features. Next, I enter
two debates directly. In the first of these entries, Chapter 2, I defend two Non-
Standard Views of Identity2 against the attack that they violate a commonly held
1 What I have written as “identity” is “equality” in the original. Frege (1892b, n. A) says he uses
“[equality] in the sense of identity [Identität] and understand[s] ‘a = b’ to have the sense of ‘a is
the same as b’ or ‘a and b coincide’.”
2 Defined below.
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principle of identity. In the second, Chapter 3, I raise an objection for a different
Non-Standard View of Identity. Finally, in Chapter 4 I apply recent developments
in the literature on ontological pluralism to identity, sketch arguments in favor of
identity pluralism, and propose new tests for pluralism more generally.
Here are some stylistic conventions I have chosen. Views and principles are intro-
duced using monospaced typeface. Subsequent uses are simply capitalized. Names
of objects and views are typeset using small caps throughout.
1.1 Principles of Identity
One contemporary articulation of the slogan that echos Frege is that “identity is
the relation that each thing has to itself and to nothing else” (Hawthorne 2003, p.
99). One way to further explicate the relation is to identify principles that it obeys.
I classify such Principles of Identity into three groups. The first group are
called Logical Principles of Identity. The second, Leibniz’s Law, is in one sense a
single principle, and in another sense two. The last group are called Metaphysical
Principles of Identity. Below I present the standard versions of these principles. As
will be articulated later, some views discussed will either call some of these principles
into question or adopt reformulations of them.
Throughout, the symbol “=” refers to identity. Precisely because what follows
concerns non-standard views of identity, it will be an open question to what relation,
if any, the symbol “=” refers. What I mean is that for some principle of identity P,
those advocating for that principle will claim that = is the identity relation, while
detractors will claim either that the principle is false or that, if “=” refers, = is not
2
the identity relation.3
1.1.1 Logical Principles of Identity
As the name suggests, Logical Principles of Identity are principles that de-
scribe the logical properties of the relation. Identity is thought to be an equivalence
relation. In fact, it can be said to be the equivalence relation. As such it is reflexive,
symmetric, and transitive.
Reflexivity of Identity
Generally, a relation is said to be reflexive when, every object stands in the relation to
itself. Specifically, identity is thought to be a relation such that every object stands
in to itself. More precisely, where ‘=’ refers to the identity relation:
Reflexivity of Identity ∀x(x = x)
Symmetry of Identity
Generally, a relation is said to be symmetric when, for two objects, the first stands in
the relation to the second just in case the second stands in it to the first. Specifically,
3 To preview the disputes, in cases when it is used in the articulation of a principle held by those
holding Standard View of Identity, those theorists will claim it refers to the identity relation.
But in those cases, someone holding a Non-Standard View of Identity might, depending on their
particular view, claim that it does not refer to identity. Conversely, when the symbol is used in
the articulation of a principle held by a Non-Standard View of Identity theorist, that theorist
will take it refer to the identity relation. But someone holding Standard View of Identity (and
even opposing Non-Standard View of Identity theorists) will say it does not refer to identity.
Context should make it clear to the reader when which type of theorist takes the symbol to refer
to identity and when which type of theorist disputes the reference.
3
identity is thought to be a relation such that one object stands in it to another just
in case the other stands in it to it. More precisely:
Symmetry of Identity ∀x∀y(x = y ↔ y = x)
Transitivity of Identity
Generally, a relation is said to be transitive when, for three objects, if the first stands
in the relation to the second and the second stands in the relation to the third, then
the first stands in the relation to the third. Specifically, identity is thought to be a
relation such that when one objects stands in it to a second and that second object
stands in it to a third, then the first object stands in it to the third. More precisely:
Transitivity of Identity ∀x∀y∀z[(x = y ∧ y = z)→ x = z]
1.1.2 Leibniz’s Law
Leibniz’s Law, attributed to Leibniz, describes the relation between property instan-
tiation and identity. Roughly, identical objects have the same properties. There are
a few more precise characterizations of this relation. One version says that if objects
are identical, then they have exactly the same properties. Another says that if ob-
jects have exactly the same properties, then they are identical. The first is called
The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the second The Identity of Indiscernibles. More
precisely, where Φ is schematic for properties:
The Indiscernibility of Identicals ∀x∀x[(x = y)→ ∀Φ(Φx↔ Φy)]
The Identity of Indiscernibles ∀x∀x[∀Φ(Φx↔ Φy)→ (x = y)]
4
It is generally thought that at least The Indiscernibility of Identicals is true.
Whether both The Indiscernibility of Identicals and The Identity of Indiscernibles
are true is more controversial. If one thinks there can be cases of distinct objects
having exactly the same properties, then one would deny the truth of The Identity
of Indiscernibles.4 In the discussion that follows, this possibility is suppressed and I
assume Leibniz’s Law is the conjunction of both directions, as follows:
Leibniz’s Law ∀x∀x[(x = y)↔ ∀Φ(Φx↔ Φy)]
1.1.3 Metaphysical Principles of Identity
As the name suggests, Metaphysical Principles of Identity are principles that
describe the metaphysical features of identity. Specifically, they describe what is true
of identical objects in different circumstances.
Absoluteness of Identity
Roughly, a relation is absolute when its holding between objects is not dependent on,
relative to, or only with respect to something else (like a category or sortal). Identity
is commonly thought to hold between objects without dependence on, relativity to,
or respect to things like categories or sortals. Here is an attempt to make this precise,
where Φ and Ψ are possible “something elses” and the subscripts are relativizations
of identity:
Absoluteness of Identity ¬  (x =Φ y ∧ x 6=Ψ y)
4 For an example of this view, see Black 1952.
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Eternality of Identity
Roughly, a relation holds eternally just in case if it holds between objects at one time,
it holds between them at all times (at least, when the objects exist). With respect
to identity, if objects are identical at some time, then they are identical at all times.
More precisely, where t ranges over times:
Eternality of Identity: ∀x∀y∀t[∃t1(t1 : x = y)→ t : x = y]
Necessity of Identity
Roughly, a relation holds necessarily just in case if it holds between objects it could
not have failed to hold beween them. With respect to identity, if objects are identical
then it not possible that they not be identical. More precisely:
Necessity of Identity: ∀x∀y[x = y → (x = y)]
Determinacy of Identity
Roughly, a relation is determinate just in case either it determinately holds or it
determinately fails to hold between objects. With respect to identity, for any objects,
either it is determinate that they are identical or it is determinate that they are not
identical (that is they are determinately distinct). More precisely, where ‘!’ expresses
determinacy:
Determinacy of Identity ∀x∀y(!x = y ∨ !x 6= y)
6
One-to-Oneness of Identity
Roughly, a relation is one-to-one just in case when the relation holds the relata have
the same cardinality.5 With respect to identity, identity only holds between single
objects and not between any plurality and a single object.6 More precisely, where xx
ranges over pluralities:
One-to-Oneness of Identity ∀x∀xx ¬(x = xx)
1.2 Views
In this section, I categorize various views about identity and the theoretical stances
taken towards Principles of Identity.
1.2.1 Standard View of Identity
If one holds the Standard View of Identity, then one holds that each of the prin-
ciples in §1.1 is true as formulated. The articulation is formulated as a necessary
5 For most discussions, the focus is on the fact that a one-to-one relation only holds between single
objects. Since the definition is meant to rule out the relation holding between a single object
and a plurality, the definition allows that relations that hold between pluralities of the same
cardinality are one-to-one.
6 One might maintain that identity holds between some pluralities. Plausibly, the relation could
hold between a collection of objects and itself. It seems that in such cases either a distinct but
closely related relation holds or identity holds in some derivative sense. In the first case, there
might be relation holding between pluralities just in case, for each of the members of one plurality,
they stand in the identity relation to exactly one of the members in the other plurality. In the
second case, identity might hold in some derivative sense just in case, for each of the members
of one plurality, they stand in the identity relation to exactly one of the members in the other
plurality. I set these possibilities aside here. What is needed is that One-to-Oneness of Identity
rule out the possibility of identity holding between a single object and a plurality.
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condition so as to anticipate the possibility that the Standard View of Identity in-
volves the commitment to more principles than those articulated above. This leaves
room for a Non-Standard View of Identity not articulated below. If a new departure
from the Standard View of Identity emerges, then a corresponding principle might
be added, and a necessary condition for holding the view might be holding this new
principle.
1.2.2 Non-Standard Views of Identity
If one rejects one of the Principles of Identity articulated in §1.1, then one holds
a Non-Standard View of Identity. This sufficient condition is meant to capture
both those who reject a principle on account of its formulation and those who reject
a principle outright. The sufficient condition leaves open the possibility (in a way
that is directly converse of the necessary condition for holding the Standard View
of Identity) for an unidentified Principle of Identity to serve as a point of departure
from the Standard View of Identity.
Here are some examples:
Relative Identity Those who hold Relative Identity reject the Absoluteness of
Identity. They hold that identity is relative to something (like a sortal).
Occasional Identity Those who hold Occasional Identity (sometimes called Tem-
porary Identity) reject Eternality of Identity. They hold that identity can hold
between objects at some times and not at others.
Contingent Identity Those who hold Contingent Identity reject Necessity of
Identity. They hold that identity can hold between objects at some worlds and
8
not at others.
Indeterminate Identity Those who hold Indeterminate Identity reject Deter-
minacy of Identity. They hold that it might be indeterminate that identity hold
between some objects.
Composition as Identity Those who hold Composition as Identity, at least in a
strong form, reject One-to-Oneness of Identity. They hold that because plural-
ities can compose a single object, pluralities can be identical to a single object.
As will be commented on in §1.3 below, these departures are defined in terms
of giving up one of the Metaphysical Principles of Identity, not one of the Logical
Principles of Identity.
1.2.3 Absolutism
Absolutism is a view toward particular Principles of Identity, and what their general
formulations ought to be.7 Absolutism toward a principle involves at least holding
that the principle is true. But it goes further to say that the only way to formulate
principles of this kind is in the way it is formulated with respect to identity.8 For
example, the way Transitivity of Identity is formulated is the way all transitivity
principles, including non-identity relations, ought to be formulated. If a principle is
not so formulated, then, according to Absolutism about transitivity, such a principle,
whether true or of interest, is not a transitivity principle.
7 The name is borrowed from Gilmore 2009.
8 This is not meant to suggest that their specific formulations with respect to identity are in some
way prior to their general form.
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Let us use a generic relation R to illustrate this.
Transitivity of Identity ∀x∀y∀z([(x = y) ∧ (y = z)]→ x = z)
Transitivity of R ∀x∀y∀z([(xRy) ∧ (yRz)]→ xRz)
Imagine Ankari holds Absolutism about transitivity. She encounters someone who
thinks parthood, normally thought to be a two-place relation, is actually a three-
place relation. As part of articulating their view of parthood, this person proposes
a transitivity principle that is not an instance of the general form Transitivity of
R shown above. Not only does Ankari think such a proposal is false, she thinks
the principle articulated as part of the theory of parthood is not even a transitivity
principle. That is, she rejects the idea that a principle could be in a form different
than the Transitivity of R form and be a transitivity principle.
Consider the following from Cody Gilmore.
Strictly speaking, of course, transitivity can be a property of two-
place relations only. Thus if we insist that parthood9 must turn out to be
transitive in the strictest possible sense, we should cling to Absolutism;
only Absolutists can take parthood (expressed by ‘<’) to be governed by
Transitivity2P: ∀x∀y∀y[(x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z]
However it is often noted that there is a very natrual and straight-
forward analogue of the transitivity principle that presumably governs
parthood if that relation has three argument places. If we symbolize the
predicate ‘x is a part of y at z’ as ‘x<zy’, then the analogue is:
Transitivity3P: ∀x∀y∀z∀w[(x <w y ∧ y <w z)→ x <w z]
9 In the original, Gilmore names the relation in question ‘Parthoodm’. This subscript is included to
make it clear he is speaking about the monist view of parthood. This specificity is not necessary
for present purposes. However, it will play a role in Chapter 4. Additional instances of ‘m’ have
been removed from this quote for clarity.
10
In words, this says that if x is part of y at w and y is part of z at w then
x is part of z at w. A somewhat different way of capturing the intuitive
idea underlying this principle is to say that the three-place relation part-
of-at is such that for any r, the two-place, ‘indexed’ relation part-of-at-r
is transitive in the strict sense. (Gilmore 2009, p. 103)
Gilmore is proposing that Transitivity3P qualifies as a transitivity principle. Ankari,
who holds Absolutism about transitivity, would reject that such a principle, even if
true or interesting, is a transitivity principle.
1.2.4 Moderation
Consider the following from André Gallois.
Suppose that Sally, Mary, and Miranda are all the same height in 1970.
In 1990 Miranda is taller than Sally.
Clearly the relation of being the same height is a transitive relation.
The following principle is indisputable:
SH ∀x∀y∀z[(x is the same height as y ∧ y is the same height as
z)→ x is the same height as z]
Now for an argument based on SH to show that Miranda and Sally
must be the same height in 1990 if Sally, Mary, and Miranda all share
their height in common in 1970. One instance of SH is:
[(Sally is the same height as Mary and Mary is the same height as
Miranda) → Sally is the same height as Miranda].
The antecedent [...] is true because Sally, Mary, and Miranda all share
their height in common in 1970. So the consequent [...] is true. However
the consequent [...] contradicts the assumption that Sally and Miranda
are not the same height in 1990. End of Argument.
The argument is an obvious sophistry. No one would hesitate to make
the following reply to it. The antecedent and consequent of any instance
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of SH have to be understood as obtaining at the same time. One way to
make this perspicuous is by replacing SH with the more explicit
SHt ∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : x is the same height as y ∧ at t : y is the same
height as z)→ at t : x is the same height as z].10 (Gallois 1998, p. 78)
Gallois (like Gilmore above) is asking for (or perhaps demanding) moderation
from his opponents. Gallois argues that it would be absurd to take from the fact that
heights change over time that the same height relation is not a transitive relation. He
claims that it would be perfectly acceptable to relativize height to times and express
the transitivity of the same height relation as above.
For any of the Principles of Identity, I define Moderation with respect to that
principle as the view that a reformulation of that principle should not be dismissed
merely for being a reformulation. This is not to say that Moderation towards a prin-
ciple implies acceptance of a reformulation or openness to any proposed formulation.
Moreover, since Moderation is relative to a principle one can hold Moderation with
respect to some principle, but hold Absolutism with respect to another.
1.2.5 Radicalism
In contrast to both Absolutism and Moderation, another stance one can take towards
Principles of Identity is Radicalism. I define Radicalism toward one of the Principles
of Identity as the stance that a reformulation of a principle is not necessary when faced
with the choice of reformulating a principle or rejecting it. From this formulation arise
two forms of Radicalism: vacuous and non-vacuous.
Here is what I mean by vacuous Radicalism. By definition, if someone rejects one
10 For consistency, the logical notation has been reformulated.
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of the Principles of Identity, then they are hold a Non-Standard View of Identity.
Because they reject one of the Principles of Identity, they would presumably not
be offering a reformulation of that principle. They then, by my definition, adopt
Radicalism with respect to that principle. They are radical, but just in virtue of
holding the view of identity that they do.
Here is what I mean by non-vacuous. It might be the case that the way in which
someone rejects one of the Principles of Identity means they can no longer hold some
distinct principle as formulated. They then have a choice. They can adopt Moderation
about that principle and make the case that their reformulation is acceptable. Or
they could reject any demand for a reformulation. This strikes me as Radicalism in
an interesting sense. The principle they do not attempt to reformulate is not the
principle they rejected from the outset, but its rejection and lack of reformulation are
downstream results of the view.11
Who adopts Radicalism about a principle in this non-vacuous way? The closest
example I can identify is Donald Baxter. I think that he is best characterized as
someone who rejects One-to-Oneness of Identity. In several places he seems to say
that he accepts that his many-one view of identity has as a consequence that some
Principles of Identity are false, and does not seem to feel the obligation to provide
11 The non-vacuous cases of Radicalism tend to be someone rejecting either Leibniz’s Law or one of
the Logical Principles of Identity as a consequence of their rejection of one of the Metaphysical
Principles of Identity. That is their rejection of one of the Metaphysical Principles of Identity is
more central to their theory of identity and they did not reject either Leibniz’s Law or one of the
Logical Principles of Identity at the outset. To preview the next section, this is because rejecting
one of the Metaphysical Principles of Identity is considered preferable to rejecting either Leibniz’s
Law or one of the Logical Principles of Identity. One is unlikely to make rejecting Leibniz’s Law
or one of the Logical Principles of Identity the focus of their Non-Standard View of Identity,
but they might be a radical with respect to one of those principles from rejecting one of the
Metaphysical Principles of Identity.
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reformulations.
He seems to reject Leibniz’s Law when he writes
Think of a mixed blessing like a car. To the extent that a car provides
easy transportation it is good. To the extent that it fouls the air it is not
good. But it is the same car that is good and not good. These are all
ways of distinguishing something from itself. I do the same thing with
a whole. The whole insofar as it occupies one location differs from the
whole insofar as it occupies another. One is in a location the other is not
in. Yet it is the same whole that is so differing. (Baxter 1988, p. 204)
However, he also seems to suggest that this rejection of Leibniz’s Law is inde-
pendently motivated, and not simply a result of his many-one identity view that he
accepts. He writes elsewhere
Countenancing the discernibility of identicals, however, ought not to
be regarded as accepting contradiction. Consider alternation. On the
face of it, the same thing becomes different. This thing as it now is differs
from itself as it was. That somethign differs from itself in such a case is
as plain as day. So there is some way for something to differ from itself
without contradiction. An account that does not preserve this literal
differing makes alteration an illusion. Commitment to the indiscernibility
of identity precludes the literal differing. It endarkens what is plain as
day. (Baxter 2014, p. 248)
Whether Baxter actually holds Radicalism in the interesting, non-vacuous sense,
he strikes me as the closest to articulating such a Radicalism.
1.3 Theory Choice
I think that the following claims accurately reflect a set of debates concerning identity.
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1. All else being equal, we should prefer theories on which the Principles of Identity
are true as formulated. That is, all else being equal, we should, for each of the
Principles of Identity, embrace Absolutism.
2. All else being equal, in choosing between theories on which one of the Principles
of Identity is false, we should prefer theories on which one of the Metaphysical
Principles of Identity is false over theories on which either one of the Logical
Principles of Identity or Leibniz’s Law is false. That is, all else being equal,
Radicalism with respect to one of the Metaphysical Principles of Identity is
preferable to Radicalism with respect to one of the Logical Principles of Identity
or Leibniz’s Law.
3. All else being equal, we should prefer theories that reformulate Principles of
Identity over those that reject them outright.
I think that their accuracy is borne out in the introductions of identity puzzles
below and the exploration of non-standard views in later chapters. One way to
support this interpretation is by thinking about the relative strength of evidence one
would need to depart from the Standard View of Identity. I take it that the Standard
View of Identity being the standard position about identity is enough to show 1. The
burden is on those who want to introduce a Non-Standard View of Identity to present
compelling evidence for doing so. In general, those who reject one of the Principles
of Identity tend to reject one of the Metaphysical Principles of Identity rather than
one of the Logical Principles of Identity or Leibniz’s Law. This suggests that 2 is
true. That those holding a Non-Standard View of Identity seem obliged to provide
reformulations for principles suggests 3 is true. This is evidenced by the difficulty of
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finding examples of those holding non-vacuous forms of Radicalism.
1.4 Arguing about Identity
In this section I describe the general contours debates about identity take. As men-
tioned above, I assume that, all things being equal, one should prefer theories that
are such that the principles of identity are true as formulated. Why might someone
consider that not all things are equal?
The dominant reason, in my estimation, is the belief of those who hold a Non-
Standard View of Identity that the world does not behave the way that the Standard
View of Identity describes. The evidence that the world does not so behave comes
from puzzle cases. These are described below. Here is the pattern this sort of argu-
ment follows.
1. If this principle of identity is true, then it leads to an unintuitive claim about
some case.
2. The unintuitive claim about the case is not true.
3. So the principle of identity is false.
The dialectic between the person advancing a Non-Standard View of Identity and
someone holding the Standard View of Identity can proceed along a few directions.
I do not assume the following are exhaustive, but they sketch the routes traveled or
resisted in the following chapters.
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1.4.1 Incoherence
Presumably the person advocating a Non-Standard View of Identity is not just of-
fering a negative theory. They are likely advancing their own Principles of Identity
or principles nearby that led to the rejection of the Standard View of Identity. One
route for an adherent of the Standard View of Identity to take is to argue that this
Non-Standard View of Identity is incoherent.
A famous instance of this argument is Gareth Evans’s brief argument against
Indeterminate Identity.12 If Evans’s argument is successful, then the discussion does
not even get to debates regarding Absolutism, Moderation, or Radicalism with respect
to the Determinacy of Identity. The proposal, according to him, does not even get
off the ground. Because it will play a role in Chapter 3, I review the argument and
possible responses.
Here is the argument where ‘5’ is the indeterminacy operator, and ‘λ’ is the
property abstraction operator:
1. 5(a = b) (Assumption for reductio)
2. ¬5 (a = a) (necessary truth about a)
3. ¬λx[5(a = x)]a (property abstraction from 2)
4. λx[5(a = x)]b (property abstraction from 1)
5. ∃X[¬Xa & Xb] (from 3 & 4)
6. a 6= b (from 5 by Leibniz’s Law, contradiction with 1)
12 Salmon (1981, Appendix I) gives a similar objection separately.
17
1 is just the claim that it is indeterminate that a is identical to b. If Indeterminate
Identity is true, then this is possibly true for some objects a and b. 2 follows from Ne-
cessity of Identity. Since a is necessarily identical to itself, it cannot be the case that
it is indeterminate that a is identical to itself. 3 abstracts the property is indetermi-
nately identical to a and restates 2. That is, a lacks the property is indeterminately
identical to a. 4 is a restatement of 1 with the same property, is indeterminately
identical to a. b has the property is indeterminately identical to a. 5 is the claim that
there exists a property that b has which a lacks. 6 follows from 5 and Leibniz’s Law
to say that a and b are distinct. 6 contracts the assumption of 1.
If the argument is valid, then any supposed case of objects being such that it is
indeterminate that they are identical will lead to a contradiction.
Replying to Evans’s Objection
1 simply assumes that two objects are indeterminately identical. 2 seems to be a nec-
essary truth that an Indeterminate Identity theorist cannot deny. An Indeterminate
Identity theorist accepts the move from 5 to 6. The Indeterminate Identity theorist
is left with challenging the moves to 3 and 4 that abstract the same property from
1 and 2, and the subsequent inference to 5 that a and b differ with respect to this
property.13
13 One response to the argument is to argue that it is invalid if the indeterminacy is due to either
of the expressions flanking the identity sign being referentially indeterminate. Lewis (1988)
argues that, at least in Evans’s case, this is to misinterpret Evans’s actual target of worldly
indeterminacy, not semantic or referential indeterminacy. Hirsch (1999) argues that there can be
semantic indeterminacy even without the expressions flanking the identity sign being referentially
indeterminate. He argues that the indeterminacy can result from indeterminacy in what he calls
the ‘referential apparatus’. However, this reply cannot aid the Indeterminate Identity theorist
since they think that the indeterminacy is in the world.
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There are two types of replies one can give. Elizabeth Barnes (2009) argues that,
by understanding Indeterminate Identity using supervaluationist semantics over coun-
terpart relations, the argument is invalid. She argues that the properties abstracted
in the moves to 3 and 4 are not the same because they do not involve the same coun-
terpart relation. If she is right, then the move to 5 equivocates between properties.
The second type of reply is to argue, as Rosanna Keefe and Terence Parsons do,
that the abstract ‘λx[5(a = x)]’ in 3 and 4 does not refer to a genuine property.
Keefe (1995, pp. 183–90) argues that, if Indeterminate Identity is true, then objects
are indeterminately identical in virtue of there being properties such that one has (or
lacks) them and it is indeterminate if the other has them. She argues that Evans’s
objection relies on the fact that the objects being such that it is indeterminate that
they are identical obtains in virtue of one of the objects having indeterminate prop-
erties which the other lacks. She objects that, while objects indeterminately have
properties, they do not have indeterminate properties.
Parsons (2000, pp. 50–2) argues that the predicate in 3 and 4 does not express
a genuine property because of how the property is constructed. Because he defines
identity in terms of sharing properties, the property abstraction from an identity
quantifies over all properties. He argues that, since the property abstraction in 3 and
4 quantifies over all properties, it quantifies over itself. According to Parsons, this
property is self-referential and problematic in a way similar to the Russell set. This
is why he thinks that the predicate does not express a genuine property.
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1.4.2 Reformulation Inadequacy
Another route is one in which the Standard View of Identity adherent adopts Modera-
tion with respect to a reformulation of one of the Principles of Identity. This interlocu-
tor agrees with the Non-Standard View of Identity theorist that the principle might
admit of reformulation, but finds reason to think that the proposed refomulation is
inadequate. This is the form that the next chapter takes.
1.4.3 Empirical Inadequacy
This route returns the charge from the Non-Standard View of Identity to the Standard
View of Identity back to the Non-Standard View of Identity theorist. Recall that the
Non-Standard View of Identity theorist claimed that because the Standard View of
Identity delivered unintuitive results this was evidence for rejecting the Standard View
of Identity. The rejoinder here is that the Non-Standard View of Identity offered also
delivers unintuitive results. I take this route in a later chapter.
1.5 Identity Puzzle Cases
In this section I review some puzzle cases that are often presented as evidence against
the Standard View of Identity and to advance a Non-Standard View of Identity.14
14 For more extensive discussions of these and other cases, see, for example, the first chapters of
Parsons 2000; Gallois 1998.
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1.5.1 Ship of Theseus
The Ship of Theseus puzzle is a famous identity puzzle. It is a version of (or
perhaps, variation on) a sorites paradox. A sorites paradox involves a series of small
changes that, individually, are not thought to make a difference to the facts of the
case. However, taking the entire series of changes does in fact lead to an obvious
difference. Accepting that the small change does not make a difference leads, at
least, to an unintuitive result.
The paradigmatic example of a sorites involves a heap made of individual grains
of sand. The case begins with a single grain. This collection of a single grain is not a
heap. The case introduces the claim that adding a single grain to a non-heap does not
result in a heap. Repeated applications of this claim results in claims that obvious
heaps (like a collection of 1 million grains) are not heaps.
Whereas the heap involves the question of when collections of grains are properly
heaps, Ship of Theseus involves questions about the identity of ships. Here is how
the puzzle goes.
Imagine Theseus has a ship made of a certain number of planks. Each day he
replaces one of the planks with a brand new plank. He proceeds to do this until
he has a ship made entirely of brand new planks. As a matter of property rights,
this ship is presumably his. But it is another question whether the ship that he now
has is the same ship that he had at the beginning. To be more precise let us, as
shown in figure 1.1, call the original ship Original Ship and the ship made entirely
of replacement planks Replacement Ship. The question is, “is Original Ship







Figure 1.1: Original Ship and Replacement Ship
It might seem obvious that the answer is yes. Presumably what underlies this
response is the intuition that changing a single part does not make a difference to the
identity of the object. Put differently, the intuition is that objects survive the change
of a single part. This is the analog to saying that a single grain does not make a
difference to whether a collection is or is not a heap.
The case is complicated by considering the planks that were replaced. Imagine
that those planks are collected and arranged in the same manner as they were when
they were part of Original Ship. Call this ship reassembled from the original planks
Reassembly Ship. In addition to “is Original Ship identical to Replacement
Ship?” we can now ask “is Original Ship identical to Reassembly Ship?”
Solving Ship of Theseus
It cannot be the case that the answer to both questions is yes. The reason is that, if









Figure 1.2: Ship of Theseus
to Reassembly Ship, then, by Transitivity of Identity, Replacement Ship is
identical to Reassembly Ship. But these are, as shown in figure 1.2, two distinct
ships, made of entirely different planks.
Here are two types of strategies for responding to the puzzle.
Every Change Counts According to this strategy, despite appearances, any change
in a part makes for a difference in identity.
Privileged Change Counts According to this strategy, not all changes are equal.
There is at least one change in a part that makes for a difference in identity.
Each strategy has its costs. The cost associated with the Every Change Counts
strategy is that it is counterintuitive. Objects seem to survive changes of their parts
all the time. According to this strategy, each time there is a change in parts, some
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object ceases to exist and a new, albeit very similar object, comes into existence. This
strategy has the virtue of not requiring any revisiting of the principles of identity, but
comes at the cost of rejecting intuitions about changes in parts. Those who opt for
this strategy likely subscribe to Mereological Essentialism. Mereological Essentialism
is the view that objects have their parts essentially; they could not have had different
parts than they do.15
The cost associated with the Privileged Change Counts strategy is that is appears
to be arbitrary. The arbitrary nature of this solution arises when we interrogate which
change or change in parts makes for a difference and why they make make a difference.
Perhaps it is the case that some parts are in some sense necessary or essential to the
object. Puzzles involving personal identity might appeal to such parts (for example,
perhaps the human brain makes for a difference for the identity of human persons).
But returning to our case of material ships, it is less obvious what part is privileged
in this way. This is especially true if we stipulate that the planks are qualitatively
the same.
Perhaps it is the case that it is not a particular plank that makes a difference, but
rather a particular plank’s place in the series of replacement that makes a difference.
Maybe the plank at exactly the halfway mark makes for the difference in identity.
One might still raise worries about arbitrariness regarding that plank. This worry is
motivated by thinking about how the replacement process might have gone differently
than originally described. For example, perhaps the process stops at some plank or
perhaps the process proceeds with a different number of planks than before. Arguably,
15 See Chisholm 1973 for an articulation of Mereological Essentialism, and Chisholm 1975; Plantinga
1975 for an early discussion of the view.
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such considerations challenge the privilege held by plank at the halfway point in the
replacement process. I will not adjudicate these issues here,16 but present them as
possible theoretical costs for the Privileged Change Counts strategy.
Another way of characterizing this arbitrariness is to attribute it to vagueness.
And one way to understand vagueness is to adopt the view, most associated with Tim-
othy Williamson, that “vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon” (Williamson 1994, p.
3). On this view, there are sharp cut-offs for sorites puzzles that really make a dif-
ference. But the difficulty we have in identifying where the change is and why that
change justifies making a difference is just a reflection of our epistemic state. Accord-
ing to this strategy, we might not know which change makes a difference, but that
does not affect the fact that a change does make a difference.
A different type of strategy takes the case as evidence that one of the principles of
identity ought to be rejected. Let us classify the Every Change Counts and Privileged
Change Counts as a Principle-Preserving Strategy. Strategies that jettison a
principle of identity can then be called a Principle-Rejecting Strategy. Chapter
3 explores the particular strategy of rejecting Determinacy of Identity.
1.5.2 Other Puzzles
Tibbles
Another type of identity puzzle involves the question of which particular collection of
parts counts as object. Imagine there is a cat, named Tibbles, on the mat.17 The
16 Although I will adjudicate related issues later.
17 According to Wiggins (1968, p. 9), Peter Geach introduced this now famous example.
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cat is composed, presumably, of collections of molecules. The number of molecules
is very large. Further, there are molecules at the edges of Tibbles such that it is
difficult to say whether or not each of those particular molecules is part of Tibbles.
For example, bits of fur might become easily detached. Are those part of Tibbles
or just temporarily attached to Tibbles?
A way of characterizing the case involves specifying cat candidates and asking for
each of them,“is this candidate identical to Tibbles?” In principle, we can consider
a candidate that has exactly a certain number of molecules as parts and ask if it
is Tibbles. We can then consider another candidate that differs with respect to
exactly one molecule and ask of that candidate whether or not it is Tibbles. A fully
articulated version of the case involves a very large number of partly overlapping cat
candidates differing from one another by some number of molecules.
The puzzle is to answer the question “which of the many cat candidates is Tib-
bles?” The difficulty becomes apparent when one considers that, for any candidate
one is tempted to offer as identical to Tibbles, it is difficult to say why the candidate
that differs from it by only one molecule is not identical to Tibbles.
A possible Principle-Preserving Strategy is, as with Ship of Theseus above,
to attribute the difficultly in determining which candidate is Tibbles to epistemic
difficulties. On this solution, there is exactly one cat candidate that is Tibbles,
but our inability to eliminate the other candidates is a reflection our poor epistemic
position. This means that we do not know which cat candidate is Tibbles, even
though one of them actually is.
A Principle-Rejecting Strategy is, as above, to deny that identity is determinate.
On this strategy, Tibbles is, at the same time, indeterminately identical to each
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of the cat candidates. This avoids arbitrariness worries since no candidate cat is
privileged.
Parcels and Six Pack
This type of identity puzzle concerns the relationship between identity and counting.
A first pass at the relationship is that when counting objects one ought to proceed
in the count when encountering an object that is distinct from each of the previously
counted objects. To do otherwise (to proceed in the count when the object is identical
to a previously counted object) is to “double count” the object. So it appears that
distinctness and non-identity go together with counting.
But the relationship is complicated by thinking about cases like the following.
Donald Baxter (1988, p. 200, p. 197, respectively) introduces cases I will call
Parcels and Six Pack. Imagine that you are purchasing a six pack, and only a six
pack, at the grocery store. The store has express checkout lines for orders of six or
less items. It would be odd if the cashier chastised you for illegitimately using the
express line. You would object that you only have one item. It would be even odder
if the cashier then said, “There are six individual beverages in the six pack. That is
six. Then the collection of the beverages is itself an individual object distinct from
the six individual beverages. This is because identity is a one-to-one relation. The
six pack cannot stand in the identity relation to six objects. So it must be distinct
from the six beverages. That means that there is one object in addition to the six.
That is why you have exceeded the six item limit.”
Your puzzlement would turn to outrage if they proceeded to charge you for seven
distinct items.
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Similarly, if someone divided a plot of land into individual parcels, sold the parcels,
and then tried to sell the original plot as a single object, we would accuse her of fraud.
In each case, we want to say that the cashier and the land owner are guilty of
double-counting. But their act of proceeding in the count seems to follow the rule
that we proceed in the count when we encounter a new object. The six pack does
not stand in the identity relation to the six beverages. And the large plot of land
does not stand in the identity relation to the smaller parcels. The puzzle is how to
reconcile the relationship between identity and counting with the intuition that there
is double-counting going on.
One Principle-Rejecting Strategy to the puzzle is to deny that identity is a one-
to-one relation. This strategy says that pluralities can stand in the identity relation
to single objects. Specifically, the objects that compose a single object are said to
collectively stand in the identity relation to the single object that they compose. A
version of this view takes the composition relation to be the identity relation.
A Principle-Rejecting Strategy must explicate the relationship between identity
and counting that allow double-counting violations to occur even when the objects
are, strictly speaking, distinct.
Truncation
Truncation is a puzzle concerning identity over time.
Consider my bicycle as represented in figure 1.3. It has lots of parts. Now consider
the collection that is all those parts except for half of the right brake lever (see figure
1.4). Because that collection of parts lacks half of the right brake lever, it is not
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Figure 1.3: Bicycle from above
identical to my bike. Now imagine that this half of the right brake lever falls off.18
Now the collection of parts without that right half of the right brake lever appears
to be identical to my bike. Now my bike just is the collection of parts that does not
include that half of the right brake lever.
On pain of denying Eternality of Identity, we cannot say that the collection of
parts without half of the right break lever was previously distinct from my bicycle,
but now is identical to it. Peter van Inwagen identifies the following assumption as
the source of this puzzle.
For every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by M
at time t, and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there
exists a material object that occupies the region sub-R at t. (van Inwagen
18 This is not difficult since it in fact happened.
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Figure 1.4: Bicycle without half of the right brake lever
1981, p. 123)
He calls this “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Detached Parts” and by denying it, he
is not forced to accept that my bicycle without the right half of the brake lever is
actually an object.
Another Principle-Preserving Strategy is to deny that objects persist through
time. This removes the temptation to think that objects might be identical at some
times and not others by denying that there is any identity across time.
As hinted above, another strategy for responding to the puzzle is to deny Eter-




Figure 1.5: Clay formed as statue and possibly as just a lump
Destruction
Destruction is a puzzle concerning identity across worlds. It comes from Allan
Gibbard (1975).
Imagine a clay statue just formed such that the clay is still malleable. It appears
that the collection of clay particles is identical to the statue. But just at the moment
of formation the clay could be pushed into a shapeless lump (see figure Figure 1.5).
The collection of clay particles would still be there. But the statue would not be.
So it seems that the collection of clay has a property the statute does not, namely
being able to survive the smushing of clay. But this seems to contradict Necessity of
Identity.
One Principle-Preserving Strategy to the cases is to allow for coincident objects.
We might have thought that the fact that the clay makes up the statue means that
the clay is identical to the statue. But if we deny this, as for example Lynn Rudder
Baker (1997) does, then we can allow that the clay is distinct from the statue that it
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makes up. And if they are distinct then there is no issue in allowing that they have
distinct properties.19
A principle rejecting route is to deny the Necessity of Identity. A Non-Standard
View of Identitythat does this is Contingent Identity.
Fission
The following example comes from Gallois (1998, §1.6). Imagine an amoeba called
Amoeba undergoes a division such that there are two amoebas at a later time. One
of them, called Slide, ends up under a microscope. The other, called Pond, ends
up in a pond. Slide and Pond seem to be distinct objects. See figure 1.6 for a
representation of the division.
But the division process could have proceeded other than it did. For example,
the amoebic material that makes up Pond could have dispersed in such a way that
Pond never came to exist (see figure 1.7). In that case, there seems to be reason to
think that Amoeba would be identical to Slide.
The same possibility could be run with Pond. The amoebic material that makes
up Slide could have dispersed in a such a way that Slide never came to exist (see
figure 1.8). In that case, there seems to be reason to think that Amoeba would be
identical to Pond.
So, considered in isolation, it seems we have reason to think that both Slide
and Pond are identical to Amoeba. If both are identical to Amoeba, then by
Transitivity of Identity, Slide and Pond are identical. But Slide and Pond are
distinct! Call this the Fission puzzle.















Figure 1.8: Pond without Slide
For reasons that will be explored in Chapter 2, Gallois thinks that his Occa-
sional Identity view can hold that Amoeba is identical to Slide and Pond without
violating Transitivity of Identity.
Fusion
The case, or a structurally similar case, can be run backwards to produce the Fusion
puzzle. In this puzzle two distinct objects fuse to form one object. Arguably, there
is reason to think that had the fusion not occurred the identity of the two objects
would be preserved. If so, then it is not the case that objects ceased to exist when the
fusion occurred. Moreover, there is reason to think that the object after the fusion
is not just a new object composed of the two objects. If so, then there is reason to
identify it with the two objects.
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For example, consider a version of the case provided by Ralf Bader (2012, p. 143).
He imagines that a tele-transporter malfunctions such that it combines the distinct
brain hemispheres into a single body. Arguably, had the malfunction never occurred,
the identity of the hemispheres would have been preserved. Further, it seems that
there is one person after the malfunction. So, there seems to be reason to think that
the distinct objects become identical as a result of the tele-transporter malfunction.20
Unlike the above cases, Fusion is not introduced by Gallois as evidence for his
Non-Standard View of Identity. In fact, it is not discussed in Gallois 1998. However,
someone might come to the same Non-Standard View of Identity that Gallois develops
by way of arguing for the plausibility of Fusion. Rather, the case is included here
because of the role that it plays in the objection to Gallois’s Occasional Identity (and
Contingent Identity) in Bader 2012. That objection is the subject of Chapter 2.
20 The actual version of the case Bader presents is more complicated and he uses it to introduce
his objection to Gallois’s Occasional Identity. I discuss it in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2: The Transitivity of Contingent Identity and Occasional Identity
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I consider objections raised by Ralph Bader (2012) against views
held by André Gallois (1998), namely, Contingent Identity and Occasional Identity.1
Bader argues that these non-standard views of identity violate one of the Logical
Principles of Identity, namely Transitivity of Identity. I argue that one can expand
Gallois’s notion of instantiation to reply to Bader’s objections.
In section 2.2, I review Bader’s arguments that Contingent Identity and Occa-
sional Identity are about relations that are not transitive. In section 2.3, I review
Gallois’s understanding of instantiation, and in section 2.4, I expand it based on his
views of temporally and modally indexed properties. In section 2.5, I apply the ex-
panded instantiation relation to a transitive relation that is not identity. Finally, in
section 2.6, I show how one can use such an expansion to meet Bader’s objections.
Recall from section 1.1 that, according to Contingent Identity, Necessity of Iden-
tity is false. According to Contingent Identity, identity can hold between objects at
some worlds and not at others. That is, it is possible that there are some objects
that are identical, but might have been distinct. Recall also from subsection 1.2.2
1 See Gallois 1998, pp. 69–70 for an argument that Occasional Identity implies Contingent Identity.
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that, according to Occasional Identity, the Eternality of Identity is false. According
to the Occasional Identity, identity can hold between objects at some times and not
at others. That is, it is possible that there are some objects that are identical at one
time, but distinct at another. Put more precisely,
Contingent Identity ♦∃x∃y[x = y ∧ ♦ x 6= y]
Occasional Identity ♦∃x∃y∃t∃t′[ at t: x = y ∧ at t′: x 6= y]
2.2 Objections from Transitivity
Recall from subsection 1.2.2 that Transitivity of Identity is the principe that says of
identity that (i) if one object is identical to a second object and (ii) the second object
is identical to a third object, then the first object is identical to the third object. Put
more precisely:
Transitivity of Identity ∀x∀y∀z[(x = y ∧ y = z)→ x = z]
2.2.1 The Argument from Transitivity against Occasional Identity
Gallois considers the following objection to Occasional Identity. Recall the case of
Fission from Chapter 1, §1.5.2 (depicted in Figure 2.1 from Chapter 1, §1.5.2. Assume
that the amoebic division described is a case of Occasional Identity.2 There is a single
amoeba, Amoeba, at t1. At t2 there is a division of the amoeba, resulting in two
distinct amoeba, Slide and Pond (named in virtue of their respective locations).
2 By “a case of Occasional Identity” and “a case of Contingent Identity” I mean a case that, if
it were true, would be sufficient for the truth of Occasional Identity or Contingent Identity,
respectively.
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Gallois (1998, pp. 75–6) maintains that at t1 Slide and Pond are identical, but at
t2 they are distinct. Here is the objection he considers:
1.1. at t1: Slide = Pond ∧ at t2: Slide 6= Pond (assumption for reductio).
1.2. That which is Pond at t1 = that which is Slide at t1 (from 1.1).
1.3. That which is Slide at t1 = that which is Slide at t2.(by Reflexivity of Iden-
tity)3
1.4. That which is Pond at t2 = that which is Pond at t1.(by Reflexivity of Identity)
1.5. That which is Pond at t1 = that which is Slide at t2 (by Transitivity of
Identity, 1.2, and 1.3).
1.6. That which is Pond at t2 = that which is Slide at t2 (by Transitivity of
Identity, 1.4, and 1.5).
1.7. at t2: Pond = Slide (From 1.6, which contradicts the assumption in 1.1.)
4
2.2.2 The Argument from Transitivity against Contingent Identity
In defending Contingent Identity, Gallois does not consider an argument from tran-
sitivity against the view. However, it is not difficult to construct an objection to
3 The opponent of Contingent Identity would justify 1.3 and 1.4 by Reflexivity of Identity. Gallois
(1998, pp. 76–7) would agree that 1.3 and 1.4 are true by the particulars of the case, but
not in virtue of Reflexivity of Identity. While not discussed in Gallois 1998, an Occasional
Identity theorist would, for reasons similar to relativizing Transitivity of Identity, only accept
a reformulation of Reflexivity of Identity that fixes the principle to the same time. See Gallois
1998, pp. 91–2 for a discussion of reflexivity.







Figure 2.1: Amoeba division
Contingent Identity that is analogous to the one just given against Occasional Iden-
tity. In fact, Bader (2012, p. 145) presents an argument like the one that follows.
Recall the case of Destruction from Chapter 1, §1.5.2. Goliath and Lump1 are
actually identical, but we are to imagine that the clay from which Goliath could
be made is compressed into a non-statue form. As a purported case of Contingent
Identity, Goliath and Lump1 would not be identical if that were to happen.
2.1. at @5: Goliath = Lump1 ∧ at w1: Goliath 6= Lump1 (assumption for re-
ductio).
2.2. That which is Goliath at @ = that which is Lump1 at @ (from 2.1).
5 Where @ is the actual world.
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2.3. That which is Lump1 at @ = that which is Lump1 at w1 (by Reflexivity of
Identity).6
2.4. That which is Goliath at w1 = that which is Goliath at @ (from Reflexivity
of Identity).
2.5. That which is Goliath at @ = that which is Lump1 at w1 (by Transitivity of
Identity, 2.2, and 2.3).
2.6. That which is Goliath at w1 = that which is Lump1 at w1 (by Transitivity of
Identity, 2.4, and 2.5).
2.7. at w1: Goliath = Lump1 (From 2.6, which contradicts the assumption in
2.1).7
2.2.3 Replying to Transitivity Arguments
Gallois replies to the argument against Occasional Identity by objecting to the appli-
cations of transitivity in 1.5 and 1.6. The reason is that the formulation of transitivity
presupposes the Standard View of Identity. The Standard View of Identity assumes
that, if the relation holds at one time, then it must hold at all times. This is pre-
cisely what Occasional Identity theorists reject (Gallois 1998, pp. 76–9). However,
Occasional Identity theorists are committed only to a formulation of Transitivity of
6 See above for a discussion of the justification for 2.3 and 2.4.
7 The names ‘Goliath’ and ‘Lump1’ are the names for a statue and lump of clay in an example
given by Allan Gibbard (1975). Gibbard argues that it is possible that a statue is identical to
the clay that composes it. However, he thinks that they could have been distinct.
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Identity that relativizes transitivity to particular times.8 Here is the formulation
Gallois claims that those who endorse Occasional Identity ought to hold:
Transitivity of Identityt: ∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : x = y ∧ at t: y = z)→ at t : x = z]
That is, for all objects and times, if (i) it is the case that one object and a second
object are identical at one time and (ii) it is the case that the second object and a
third object are identical at that same time, then it is the case that the first object and
the third object are identical at that same time. Adopting Transitivity of Identityt
as the reformulation of Transitivity of Identity allows those who endorse Occasional
Identity to object to the argument in subsection 2.2.1. According to Transitivity
of Identityt, one cannot rely on transitivity to make inferences about identities at
distinct times. Proponents of Occasional Identity can reply by pointing out that the
identities in 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 are identities across distinct times. These identities are
not the antecedents of instances of Transitivity of Identityt. So the argument fails
on this formulation of transitivity, because the moves to 1.5 and 1.6 are not correct
applications of modus ponens.
Similarly, Bader points out that proponents of Contingent Identity can appeal to
the following reformulation of Transitivity of Identity that relativizes with respect to
worlds to block the objection to Contingent Identity at lines 2.5 and 2.6.
Transitivity of Identityw: ∀x∀y∀z∀w[( at w : x = y ∧ at w: y = z) → at
w : x = z]
8 See Chapter 1, §1.3 for a discussion of the merits of reformulating Principles of Identity with
respect to theory choice.
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That is, for all objects and worlds, if (i) it is the case that one object and a second
object are identical at one world and (ii) it is the case that the second object and
a third object are identical at that same world, then it is the case that the first
object and the third object are identical at that same world. Adopting Transitivity
of Identityw as the reformulation of Transitivity of Identity allows those who endorse
Contingent Identity to object to the argument in subsection 2.2.2. According to
Transitivity of Identityw, one cannot rely on transitivity to make inferences about
identities at distinct worlds. Proponents of Contingent Identity can reply by pointing
out that the identities in 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are identities across distinct worlds. These
identities are not the antecedents of instances of Transitivity of Identityw. So the
argument fails on this formulation of transitivity, because the moves to 2.5 and 2.6
are not correct applications of modus ponens.
2.2.4 Bader’s Objections from the Transitivity of Identity
However, the above objections are not the arguments that Bader uses to object to
Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity. His arguments rely on the possibility
fusions of objects occurring at the same time as fissions of those objects. Gallois
(1998, Chap. 1, §VI) presents his view of Occasional Identity as a view that can
explain identity puzzles. According to him, the case of Amoeba, Slide, and Pond
is a case of Occasional Identity.
Reverse cases presumably are examples of fusions, where the pre-fusion objects
are distinct, but identical after the fusion. Bader assumes that Gallois takes his view
to apply to cases of fusions. The example of the truncated car can be seen as such a





Figure 2.2: Two Amoebas Dividing
I present generalizations of Bader’s arguments. He uses the possibility of tele-
portation and the severing of brain hemispheres to present a case of simultaneous
fissions and fusion and a modally analogous case (Bader 2012, p. 143, pp. 145–6). I
do not think that Bader’s reliance on this particular version of co-located fissions and
fusion is compelling. It seems that, for it to be compelling, one must accept some
assumptions about personal identity. However, I think that the general form of the
arguments are serious objections to Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity.
Against Occasional Identity
Bader’s argument against Occasional Identity begins with two objects b and d at
at time t1. There are two fissions of each of these objects at a later time t2. In a
simpler case (see Figure 2.2), this would mean that there are now four objects at t2
(a pair that at t1 were identical to b and another pair that at t1 were identical to d).








Figure 2.3: Fission and Fusion of Two Amoebas
the post-fission objects of b was fused with one of the post-fission objects of d. This
means that there are three, rather than four, objects at t2. Let a be the post-fission
object of b that did not fuse. Let e be the post-fission object of d that did not fuse.
Let c be the fusion of the post-fission objects of b and d (Bader 2012, pp. 143–4). See
figure Figure 2.3 for a representation of the case.
According to Occasional Identity, the distinct objects that result from a fission
are identical prior to the fission. Conversely, objects that were distinct prior to a
fusion are identical after it. So, at t1, a and c are identical in virtue of being b at t1.
Similarly, at t1, c and e are identical in virtue of being d at t1. However, since at t1,
b 6= d, it is not the case that, at t1, a = e.
Bader’s objection can then be formulated as follows.
3.1. ∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : x = y ∧ at t: y = z)→ at t : x = z] (assumption for reductio).
3.2. at t1 : a = c ∧ at t1: c = e ∧ at t1 : a 6= e (from the case)
3.3. (at t1 : a = c ∧ at t1: c = e)→ at t1 : a = e (instance of 3.1).
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3.4. at t1 : a = e ∧ at t1 : a 6= e (from 3.2 and 3.3, a contradiction).
3.5. ¬∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : x = y ∧ at t: y = z) → at t : x = z] (the negation of
Transitivity of Identityt).
Recall from Chapter 1, §1.2.4 that Moderation is one of the attitudes one can
take to one of the Principles of Identity. In the debate between Gallois and Bader,
both have taken the stance of Moderation toward Transitivity of Identity. Gallois, as
a proponent of a Non-Standard View of Identity that rejects Transitivity of Identity
as formulated has offered Transitivity of Identityt as a reformulation. By his objec-
tion, Bader accepts the reformulation as a plausible reformulation of Transitivity of
Identity. His objection is against the adequacy of Transitivity of Identityt. Since,
according to him, Transitivity of Identityt is false, by a plausible Occasional Identity
interpretation of simultaneous fissions and fusion, then Occasional Identity is false in
one of two ways. Either the theory says true things about a relation it falsely claims is
the relation is the identity relation or it says false things about the identity relation.
That is, the theory fails either at describing the relation it purports to or what it
does say is not true.
Against Contingent Identity
Bader objects to Contingent Identity with an analogous argument. Instead of there
being a case of simultaneous fissions and a fusion, he imagines a case where two
objects might have been subject to a fission and fusion. In the modal analog, at w1
objects b and d are distinct. In w2, b is distinct objects a and c, and d is distinct








Figure 2.4: Possible Fission and Fusion of Two Amoebas
As in the temporal case, objects a and c that are distinct in w2 are identical in w1
in virtue of being b there. By the same reasoning, objects c and e that are distinct
in w2 are identical in w1 in virtue of being d there (Bader 2012, pp. 144–6). The
objection can be run as follows.
4.1. ∀x∀y∀z∀w[( at w : x = y ∧ at w: y = z) → at w : x = z] (assumption for
reductio).
4.2. at w1 : a = c ∧ at w1: c = e ∧ at w1 : a 6= e (from the case).
4.3. (at w1: a = c ∧ at w1: c = e) → at w1 : a = e (instance of 4.1).
4.4. at w1 : a = e ∧ at w1: a 6= e (From 4.2 and 4.3, a contradiction).
4.5. ¬∀x∀y∀z∀w[( at w : x = y ∧ at w: y = z) → at w : x = z] (the negation of
Transitivity of Identityw).
As with Occasional Identity, the debate is between those who have taken the
stance of Moderation toward Transitivity of Identity. Gallois is offering Transitivity
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of Identityw as a reformulation of Transitivity of Identity. By his objection, Bader
accepts the reformulation as a plausible reformulation Transitivity of Identity. His
objection is against the adequacy of Transitivity of Identityw. Since, according to him,
Transitivity of Identityw is false, by a plausible Contingent Identity interpretation of
possibly simultaneous fissions and fusion,9 Contingent Identity is false in one of two
ways. Either the theory says true things about a relation it falsely claims is the
relation is the identity relation or it says false things about the identity relation.
That is, the theory fails either at describing the relation it purports to or what it
does say is not true.
2.3 Instantiation as a Relation
To respond to the above arguments, I will argue that Gallois ought to reformulate
Transitivity of Identityt and Transitivity of Identityw in light of his understanding of
instantiation.
Gallois motivates his version of Occasional Identity by arguing that it best solves
puzzle cases about identity.10 The puzzles combine two types of issues about identity.
The first type of issue, diachronic identity, concerns the identity and distinctness
of objects across time. The second type of issue, synchronic identity, concerns the
9 This is perhaps too hasty. According to Gallois (1998, pp. 69–70), while Occasional Identity
implies Contingent Identity, Contingent Identity does not imply Occasional Identity. It could be
that a Contingent Identity theorist who does not accept Occasional Identity would not interpret
the case of possible simultaneous fissions and fusion in the way Gallois does. In that case, Bader’s
target might not be the adequacy of Transitivity of Identityw in general, but rather its adequacy
when accompanied by certain commitments held by those who espouse Occasional Identity in
addition to Contingent Identity.
10 See Gallois (1998, Chap. 2) for the puzzles he considers.
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identity and distinctness of objects at the same time. Issues of diachronic identity are
part of the general problem of explaining how objects can persist and yet change. In
this respect, Gallois’s particular version of Occasional Identity involves commitments
within the debate about persistence and change.
I assume that the claim that objects can be identical at one time but distinct at
another, especially as a solution to identity puzzles, is best understood in conjunction
with the view that objects persist “by being wholly present at more than one time”
(Lewis 1986, p. 202). That is, Occasional Identity seems to go with Endurantism.
Otherwise, Gallois could the style of strategies employed by Perdurantism11 and
Exdurantism12 for dealing with the puzzles that he identifies.
As an Endurantist, Gallois should have an explanation for how objects can have a
property at one time and lack it at another. Gallois (1998, pp. 37–8) considers several
ways of understanding what it is for an object to instantiate a property at a time. He
rejects the proposal that properties should be thought of as relations between objects
and times. He also rejects views that explain having properties at particular times in
terms of sentential operators or as adverbial modifiers of instantiation.13 The view
he accepts treats instantiation as a three-place relation between objects, properties
and times.14
11 The view that objects persist “by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times,
though no part of is wholly present at more than one time” (Lewis 1986, p. 202).
12 The view that objects persist by having counterparts of itself at different times. See Haslanger
2003, especially §2, for more on different views of persistence.
13 The former would read “a is F at t” as “at t it is the case that a is F.” The latter would read “a
is F at t” as “a is t-ly F.”
14 Lewis (2002, §4) argues that treating instantiation as a relation leads to an infinite explanatory
regress. At present, I refrain from attempting to reply to this objection on Gallois’s behalf, but
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Where I is the instantiation relation, a the instantiating object, F the instantiated
property, and t the time of instantiation, let the view be expressed by the following
schema:
Instantiation at a TimeG: at t: a is F just in case I(a, F, t).
15
Gallois does not address his interpretation of analogous modal predication (like
at w: a is F ). If he were to take the same view as he does in the case of time, then
we can provide the following schema for instantiation at a world.
Where I is the instantiation relation, a the instantiating object, F the instantiated
property, and w the world of instantiation:
Instantiation at a WorldG: at w: a is F just in case I(a, F, w).
2.4 Expanding the Instantiation Relation
In this section I will argue that the notion of instantiation just characterized should
be revised. The revision is motivated by considering Gallois’s understanding of tem-
porally and modally indexed properties. This results from considering his replies to
objections to both Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity based on Leibniz’s
Law. One of the arguments he replies to is given by Saul Kripke (1971). This argu-
ment relies on the Necessity of Self-Identity. This is the claim that, necessarily,
everything is identical to itself. Gallois treats the Necessity of Self-Identity as a claim
note that a full defense of instantiation as a relation requires a reply to this objection.
15 Gallois’s formulation is in terms of truth conditions for the sentence expressing the proposition
that at t: a is F . I take it that the truth conditions of the sentence depend in some way on those
of the proposition.
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about a modally indexed property that quantifies over all worlds. According to him,
something is necessarily self-identical just in case whatever it is identical to at some
world is identical to it at all worlds.
Gallois also replies to a temporal analog of this argument from the Eternality
of Self-Identity. This is the claim that everything is identical to itself at all times.
He treats this as a claim about a temporally indexed property that quantifies over
all times. Similarly, according to him, something is always self-identical just in case
whatever it is identical to at some time is identical to it at all times.
2.4.1 Kripke’s Objection
Kripke’s argument against Contingent Identity, and the analogous argument against
Occasional Identity, appeal to Leibniz’s Law. For reasons similar to those for rela-
tivizing transitivity, Gallois accepts only the following relativized versions of Leibniz’s
Law, where Φ is schematic for properties:
Leibniz’s Lawt: ∀t∀x∀y [at t : x = y → (at t: Φx↔ at t: Φy)]
Leibniz’s Laww: ∀w∀x∀y [at w : x = y → (at w: Φx↔ at w: Φy)]
Here is a formulation of Kripke’s argument against Contingent Identity using
Leibniz’s Laww, given as a reductio:
16
5.1. at w1: a = b ∧ at w2: a 6= b (a case of Contingent Identity, an assumption for
reductio).
16 Roughly, the following formulation follows the order given in Kripke 1971, while making more of
the suppressed steps explicit as Gallois 1998, p. 142 does.
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5.2. ∀x necessarily: x = x (Necessity of Self-Identity).
5.3. ∀w∀x∀y [at w : x = y → (at w: Φx↔ at w: Φy)] (Leibniz’s Laww).
5.4. at w1: a = b → [at w1: necessarily:(a = a) ↔ at w1: necessarily(a = b)] (an
instance of 5.3)17
5.5. at w1: necessarily:(a = b) ∧ at w2: a 6= b (from 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4, a contradic-
tion).
The argument begins (5.1) by assuming, for reductio, a purported case of Con-
tingent Identity. 5.2 is just Necessity of Self-Identity. 5.3 is Leibniz’s Laww, the
reformulation of Leibniz’s Law adopted by proponents of Contingent Identity. 5.4 is
an instance of Leibniz’s Laww with the property is necessarily identical to a. 5.5 says
that b has the property is necessarily identical to a and is not identical to a at w2.
This is a contradiction.
And here is the analogous argument against Occasional Identity:
6.1. at t1: a = b ∧ at t2: a 6= b (a case of Occasional Identity, an assumption for
reductio).
6.2. ∀x always: x = x (Eternality of Self-Identity).
6.3. ∀t∀x∀y [at t : x = y → (at t: Φx↔ at t: Φy)] (Leibniz’s Lawt).
6.4. at t1: a = b → [at t1: always: (a = a) ↔ at t1: always: (a = b)] (an instance of
6.3).
17 Potential worries about mixing modal operators with quantification over worlds will be resolved
when the former is understood in terms of the latter in Gallois’s reply below.
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6.5. at t1: always: (a = b) ∧ at t2: a 6= b (from 6.1, 6.2, and 6.4, a contradiction).18
The argument begins (6.1) by assuming, for reductio, a purported case of Oc-
casional Identity. 6.2 is just Necessity of Self-Identity. 6.3 is Leibniz’s Lawt, the
reformulation of Leibniz’s Law adopted by proponents of Occasional Identity. 6.4 is
an instance of Leibniz’s Lawt with the property is always identical to a. 6.5 says that
b has the property is always identical to a and is not identical to a at w2. This is a
contradiction.
Each formulation of the arguments is intended to result in a contradiction between
the conjuncts in lines 5.5 and 6.5. The first conjunct in 5.5 expresses that b is such
that at w1 it is necessarily identical with a. The second conjunct expresses that b is
such that it is distinct from a at w2. In the temporal analog, the first conjunct in 6.5
expresses that a is such that at t1 it is always identical with b. The second conjunct
expresses that b is such that it is distinct from a at t2.
2.4.2 Gallois’s Replies
Gallois’s response is to argue that the conjunctions in lines 5 of both arguments are
not contradictions. He does this by arguing that what it means for something to
have a necessary property at a given world is for, in that world, the object to be
identical to something that, at all worlds, has that property at all worlds. Similarly,
18 Gallois (1998, Chap. 5, §V; Chap. 6, §VII) presents versions of the original argument from
Kripke (1971, p. 136). The arguments ignore the complications that arise from considering
objects that do not exist at some worlds or times. Presumably one can ignore these complications
by conditionalizing the universal generalizations. Or one might hold that there are facts about
an object’s identity that obtain even when an object does not exist. Relatedly, Gallois (1998, p.
83, n. 7) does not intend his account to commit him to views about whether or not non-existent
fictional objects have properties.
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according to him, for an object to have an eternal property at a time is for it to be
identical to something at that time that has that property at all times. Here are the
formalizations of those claims:
Necessarily-at-a-world: ∀x∀w[( at w: necessarily: Φx) ↔ ∃y( at w: x = y ∧
∀w′(at w′: Φy))]
Always-at-a-time: ∀x∀t[( at t: always: Φx)↔ ∃y( at t: x = y ∧ ∀t′(at t′: Φy))]19
If these generalizations are true, then the conjunctions in lines 5 of each argument
are not contradictions. Consider the instances of Necessarily-at-a-world and Always-
at-a-time corresponding to the first conjunct from lines 5 of each argument:
• at w1: necessarily: (a = b) ↔ ∃y( at w1: b = y ∧ ∀w( at w: a = y))
• at t1: always: (a = b) ↔ ∃y( at t1: b = y ∧ ∀t( at t: a = y))20
If the first conjuncts in lines 5 are in fact equivalent to the right-sides of these
biconditionals, then there are no contradictions. In the modal case, b has the property
of necessarily being identical to a at w1 just in case there is something it is identical
to at w1 that is identical to a at every world. Such a something is a. a is identical to
b at w1 and a also identical to a at every world. In particular, a is identical to a at
w2: the world in which it is distinct from b.
19 These are formulated on p. 154 and p. 129, respectively.
20 Note that the left-side of each biconditional is meant to, in each case, express the predication of a
necessary and eternal property to b at w1 and t1. In the first case it is the property of necessarily
being identical to a. In the second, it is the property of always being identical to a.
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Similarly, in the temporal case, b has the property of always being identical to a
at t1 just in case there is something it is identical to at t1 that is identical to a at
every time. Such a something is a. a is identical to b at t1 and a also identical to a
at every time. In particular, a is identical to a at t2: the time at which it is distinct
from b.
For the predication of modally and temporally indexed properties that reference
only single worlds and times, Gallois argues that the following hold:
Possibly-at-a-world: ∀x∀w∀w′[( at w: at w′: Φx) ↔ ∃y( at w: x = y ∧ at w′:
Φy)]
Sometime-at-a-time: ∀x∀t∀t′[( at t: at t′: Φx)↔ ∃y( at t: x = y ∧ at t′: Φy)].21
Notice the structural similarity between Necessarily-at-a-world and Possibly-at-a-
world. The former says that for an object, at a world, to instantiate the property is
necessarily Φ is for that object, at that world, to be identical to something that at all
worlds is Φ. The latter says that for an object, at a world, to instantiate the property
is possibly Φ is for that object, at that world, to be identical to something that at some
21 When presented (on p. 149 and p. 84, respectively), these are considered along with variations
that replace the existential quantifier that binds the y variable in the right-hand side of the
biconditional with a universal quantifier. On these understandings of modally and temporally
indexed properties, to have such a property is for everything that an object is identical to at that
world or time to have the property at another world or time. Arguably, while objects might have
modally and temporally indexed properties in this sense, these construals cannot capture some
modally and temporally indexed properties that Contingent Identity and Occasional Identity
theorists might want to capture. Gallois officially accepts that there might be some properties
that are best captured under this formulation. However, in the case of necessary and eternal
properties, he argues that the formulations with existential quantifiers best capture what it
means for an object to have necessary and eternal properties, respectively. Further, he suggest
that the interpretation of eternal properties and temporally indexed properties naturally come
together. Similarly, for necessary and modally indexed properties. If this is so, then there is
reason to accept the existential formulations rather than the universally quantified ones.
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world is Φ. The only differences between them are (i) “necessarily” in the former is
replaced with “at w′” in the latter and (ii) “∀w′” inside the existential generalization
in the former is replaced with “at w′” in the latter. Similarly for Always-at-a-time
and Sometime-at-a-time.
Gallois’s full defense of his interpretations of the predication of modally and tem-
porally indexed properties is too extensive to review here.22 The following are repre-
sentative of how he motivates this interpretation of temporally and modally indexed
properties. With respect to temporally indexed properties he writes,
What does it take for it to be true that in 1990 George Bush will be
the former President in 2000? ... In 1990 George Bush will be a former
President in 2000 if and only if there exists someone who is identical with
George Bush in 1990, and who is a former President in 2000. (Gallois
1998, pp. 83–4)
And with respect to modally indexed properties he says,
It seems just as reasonable to say that, for example, in [the actual
world] Car has the characteristic of being a car in W ∗ just in case some-
thing which is identical with Car in the actual world is a car in W ∗.
(Gallois 1998, p. 149)
Gallois (1998, pp. 96–9, pp. 155–7) accepts that a consequence of this view is
that the following inferences are invalid:
Immutability Thesis: at t: at t′: φ ∴ at t′: φ
Modal Invariance: at w: at w′: φ ∴ at w′: φ23
22 Such defenses are given in Chaps. 3, 5, and 6.
23 The names are those in the original.
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2.4.3 Instantiation
With Gallois’s interpretations of modally and temporally indexed properties available,
I note a disharmony between the instantiation of these properties and the instantiation
of properties that are not modally or temporally indexed. Consider an object a, a
property F , times t and t′, and worlds w and w′. Recall that Gallois’s understanding
of instantiation means that he accepts the following,
Instantiation-at-a-timeG: at t: a is F just in case I(a, F, t).
Instantiation-at-a-worldG: at w: a is F just in case I(a, F, w).
However, according to Gallois, the following biconditionals are true according to
his generalizations about modally and temporally indexed properties:
at t: at t′: Fa ↔ ∃y( at t: a = y ∧ at t′: Fy),
at w: at w′: Fa ↔ ∃y( at w: a = y ∧ at w′: Fy),
at t: always: Fa ↔ ∃y( at t: a = y ∧ ∀t′( at t′: Fy),
and
at w: necessarily: Fa ↔ ∃y( at w: a = y ∧ ∀w′( at w′: Fy).
The right-hand side of the biconditionals concern several things: the object a,
something that object is identical to (the object satisfying the existential quantifier),
a property F , a time t or world w at which the identity holds, and another time t′
or world w′ at which the predication holds. This side of the biconditionals concerns
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how five things are related,24 whereas Gallois presents instantiation to be a relation
between three things.25 I propose to unify Gallois’s analysis of instantiating a property
at a time or world and his interpretation of instantiating temporally and modally
indexed properties at a time or world. Let the following schemas express the relation
between an object having a temporally or modally indexed property at a time or
world, on the one hand, and the five-place instantiation relation, on the other.
InstantiationtG*: at t: at t
′: a is F just in case ∃xI(a, x, F, t, t′)
InstantiationwG*: at w: at w
′: a is F just in case ∃xI(a, x, F, w, w′)
To unify the cases of temporally or modally indexed instantiation of a property
with the cases of temporally or modally indexed instantiation of a temporally or
modally indexed property, I propose that the former be a special case of the latter.
That is, the Occasional Identity or Contingent Identity theorist should take the I
relation in InstantiationtG* or InstantiationwG* to be the instantiation relation.
There is an understandable tendency to read the expanded instantiation relation
as follows.26 In the temporal case, an object a at t has a property F at t′ just in
24 More precisely, the latter two, in virtue of either quantifying over all times or quantifying over
all worlds, concern at least five things.
25 One might object to how I have counted on the basis of the identity between the object a and
what is bound by y. This is due to the link between counting and identity. While it is true that
at one time or one world, these objects are identical, the views under consideration allow that
they might be distinct at other times and worlds. While it would be double counting to count
them as distinct at that particular time or that particular world, it is not double counting when
generalizing over all times and worlds.
26 In a previous version of this chapter, an anonymous reviewer identified my previous articulation
of the relation as problematic because it assumed Gallois’s original three-place instantiation
relation.
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case there exists an object x that a is identical to at t that has the property F at t′.
Similarly, in the modal case, an object a at w has a property F at a world w′ just in
case there exists an object x that a is identical to at w that has the property F at
w′. Conceptually, we could then classify the first time or world as the time or world
of identity and the second time or world as the time or world of instantiation.
The tendency is explained by the assumptions that identity is permanent and
necessary. If we make these assumptions, then we can collapse the five-place instan-
tiation relation into the more familiar three-place one. If identity is never occasional,
then we have no need to track which objects things are identical to or distinct from
at particular times. Similarly, if identity is never contingent, then we have no need to
track which objects things are identical to or distinct from at particular worlds. So,
under these assumptions, we might be tempted to say that:
I(a, a, F, t, t)↔ I(a, F, t)
and
I(a, a, F, w, w)↔ I(a, F, w).
However, my proposal for Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity theorists
is that strictly speaking they ought to understand instantiation as a five-place rela-
tion. Perhaps in contexts where it is safe to assume that the Immutability Thesis
or Modal Invariance are valid inferences, we can talk as if an object can simply in-
stantiate a property at a time or a world.27 However, I think that such talk should
27 For example, cases when we can assume that an object is not temporally or contingently iden-
tical to something might be cases in which Immutability Thesis and Modal Invariance are valid
inferences, respectively.
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be understood as shorthand for the relation of instantiation that holds between two
objects, a property, and two times or two worlds. It just happens that some instances
of the instantiation relation holding are between the same objects, a property, and
the same times or same worlds. Another way to understand this is to think of the
original three-place instantiation relation as a special case of the proposed five-place
instantiation relation.
2.4.4 Relations
Although Gallois does not extend his understanding of instantiation to relations, I
think that the following would be plausible candidates for schemas of the instantiation
of a two-place relation, given his view of instantiation for monadic properties.
Instantiationr-at-a-timeG: at t: a stands in R to b just in case I(a, b, R, t)
Instantiationr-at-a-worldG: at w: a stands in R to b just in case I(a, b, R,w)
On the proposed expanded notion of instantiation, the schemas for the instantia-
tion of a two-place relation would be the following.
InstantiationrtG*: at t: at t
′: a stands in R to b just in case ∃x∃yI(a, x, b, y, R, t, t′)
InstantiationrwG*: at w: at w
′: a stands inR to b just in case ∃x∃yI(a, x, b, y, R,w, w′)
As with InstantiationtG*, there is a temptation to read InstantiationrtG* as follows.
Objects a and b at t stand in relation R at t′ just in case there exists objects x and
y such that a is identical to x and b is identical to y at t and x and y stand in
relation R at t′. Similarly, as with InstantiationwG*, there is a temptation to read
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InstantiationrwG* as follows. Objects a and b at w stand in relation R at w
′ just
in case there exists objects x and y such that a is identical to x and b is identical
to y at w and x and y stand in relation R at w′. But as with InstantiationtG* and
InstantiationwG*, these readings presuppose the instantiation of relations. Strictly
speaking, my proposal is that Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity theorists
ought to say that two-place relation instantiation is seven-place.
This can be expanded to n-place relations so that n-place instantiation is (2n+3)-
place.
2.5 Return to Transitivity
In this section I argue for a reformulation of Transitivity of Identity in light of the
expanded instantiation relation. I start by considering a relation, assumed to be
transitive, other than identity. In the next section I show how this reformulation of
Transitivity of Identity blocks Bader’s objection.
2.5.1 Transitivity of Relations other than Identity
Consider the relation is to the right of.28 Like identity, it is a transitive relation.
When (i) an object is to the right of a second object and (ii) the second object is to
the right of a third, then the first object is to the right of the third. However, unlike
identity, it is neither symmetric nor reflexive. If an object is to the right of a second
object, then the second object is not to the right of the first object. Under simplifying




Figure 2.5: Slide, Tree, and Pond
assumptions,29 it is not the case that objects are ever to the right of themselves. So,
while transitive like identity, is to the right of is not an equivalence relation like
identity.
Recall Gallois’s original amoeba case (introduced in Chapter 1, §1.5.2 and reviewed
above) where the Amoeba at t1 divides into Pond and Slide at t2. Now imagine,
as depicted in Figure 2.5, that between Pond and Slide at t2 there is a tree, called
Tree, such that Pond is to the right of Tree, and Tree is to the right of Slide.
Given that the relation is transitive, we can correctly infer from the fact that at t2,
Pond is to the right of Tree, and that at t2 Tree is to the right of Slide, that at
t2 Pond is to the right of Slide.
But recall that, because this is a case of amoebic division, at t2 Amoeba is Slide.
So, at t2, Tree is to the right of Amoeba. Moreover, at t2, Amoeba is Pond. So,
at t2, Pond is to the right of Tree. So, by the transitivity of is to the right of, at
29 For example, let us assume for present purposes that the geometry is not curved.
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t2 Tree is to the right of Tree.
30 This is contrary to the assumption that is to the
right of is never reflexive.
The correct diagnosis of what is going on in the case becomes apparent when
we move from the original Occasional Identity understanding of instantiation to one
proposed in subsection 2.4.3. Recall that Gallois says that he accepts the following
reformulation of the Transitivity of Identity.
Transitivity of Identityt: ∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : x = y ∧ at t: y = z)→ at t : x = z]
This reformulation says that, for all objects and times, when, at a time, (i) one
object is identical to a second object and (ii) the second object is identical to a third
object, then, at that time, the first object is identical to the third.
Presumably, he would be prepared to accept the following formulation, where RT
is the is to the right of relation, of a transitivity principle for is to the right of.
Transitivity of RTt: ∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : xRTy ∧ at t: yRTz)→ at t : xRTz].
This says that, for all objects and times, when, at a time, (i) one object is to the
right of a second and (ii) the second is to the right of a third, then the first object is
to the right of the third.
If we, according to InstantiationtG*, formulate this principle in terms of instanti-
ation, then the principle would read as follows.
Transitivity of RTt: ∀x∀y∀z∀t[(I(x, y, RT, t) ∧ I(y, z, RT, t))→ I(x, z, RT, t)]
30 It is also the case that by transitivity, Amoeba is to the right of Amoeba. This is because
Amoeba is Pond which is to the right of Tree which is to the right of Slide which is identical
to Amoeba.
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This says that, for all objects and times, when (i) the instantiation relation holds
between one object, a second object, the relation is to the right of, and a time, and
(ii) the instantiation relation holds between the second object, a third object, the
is to the right of relation, and the same time, then the instantiation relation holds
between the first object, the third object, the relation is to the right of, and the same
time.
An instance of Transitivity of RTt involving Slide, Tree, and Pond is:
A: [I(Pond,Tree, RT, t2) ∧ I(Tree,Slide, RT, t2)]→ I(Pond,Slide, RT, t2)
This says that when (i) the instantiation relation holds between Pond, Tree,
the relation is to the right of, and t2, and (ii) the instantiation relation holds between
Tree, Slide, the is to the right of relation, and t2, then the instantiation relation
holds between Pond, Slide, the relation is to the right of, and t2. And in the case
we imagined, both conjuncts of the antecedent are true. The instantiation relation
holds between Pond, Tree, the relation is to the right of, and t2 because the case
says that, at t2, Pond is to the right of Tree. And the instantiation relation holds
between Tree, Slide, the relation is to the right of, and t2 because the case says
that, at t2, Tree is to the right of Slide.
Since the antecedent is true, then we can infer from it and the conditional that
the instantiation relation holds between Pond, Slide, the relation is to the right of,
and t2. This is true according to the case because Pond is to the right of Slide at
t2.
However, consider the following instance of Transitivity of RTt.
B: [I(Tree,Amoeba, RT, t2)∧I(Amoeba,Tree, RT, t2)]→ I(Tree,Tree, RT, t2)
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This says that when (i) the instantiation relation holds between Tree, Amoeba,
the relation is to the right of, and t2, and (ii) the instantiation relation holds between
Amoeba, Tree, the is to the right of relation, and t2, then the instantiation relation
holds between Tree, Tree, the relation is to the right of, and t2. And in the case we
imagined, both conjuncts of the antecedent are true. The instantiation relation holds
between Tree, Amoeba, the relation is to the right of, and t2 because the case says
that, at t2, Tree is to the right of Amoeba in virtue of Amoeba being Slide at t2.
And the instantiation relation holds between Amoeba, Tree, the relation is to the
right of, and t2 because the case says that, at t2, Amoeba is to the right of Tree in
virtue of Amoeba being Pond at t2.
Since the antecedent is true, we can infer from it and the conditional that the
instantiation relation holds between Tree, Tree, the relation is to the right of, and
t2. However, unlike the consequent of A, this, the consequent of B, is false according
to the case because Tree is not to the right of itself at t2 (as no object is to the right
of itself).
Reformulating the transitivity of is to the right of in terms of the five-place in-
stantiation relation suggested in subsection 2.4.3, allows us to validly infer an analog
to the consequent of A, without inferring that the analog of the consequent of B is
true.
The following is a first pass at the reformulation.
Transitivity of RTte:
∀x∀y∀z∀t[(∃x1∃y1I(x, x1, y, y1, RT, t, t) ∧ ∃y2∃z2I(y, y2, z, z2, RT, t, t))
→ ∃x3∃z3I(x, x3, z, z3, RT, t, t)]
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This reformulation says, for all objects x, y, and z, and for all times t, when (i)
there exists two objects x1 and y1 such that the instantiation relation holds between
x, x1, y, y1, the relation is to the right of, t, and t, and (ii) there exists two objects
y2 and z2 such that the instantiation relation holds between y, y2, z, z2, the relation
is to the right of, t, and t, then there exists two objects x3 and z3 such that the
instantiation relation holds between x, x3, z, z3, the relation is to the right of, t, and
t.
According to the case, both I(Pond,Pond,Tree,Tree, RT, t2, t2) and
I(Tree,Tree,Slide,Slide, RT, t2, t2) are the case. For to understand Pond being
to the right of Tree at t2 in terms of the five-place instantiation relation is to say
that the instantiation relation holds between Pond, Pond, Tree, Tree, the rela-
tion is to the right of, t2, and t2. And to understand Tree being to the right of Slide
at t2 in terms of the five-place instantiation relation is to say that the instantiation
relation holds between Tree, Tree, Slide, Slide, the relation is to the right of, t2,
and t2. This satisfies both conjuncts in an instance of Transitivity of RTte, so we can
conclude ∃x∃yI(Pond, x, Slide, y, RT, t2, t2). This inference gets the case right since
I(Pond,Pond,Slide,Slide, RT, t2, t2) is true. This is because Pond being to the
right of Slide at t2 understood in terms of the five-place instantiation relation is the
instantiation relation holding between Pond, Pond, Slide, Slide, the relation is
to the right of, t2, and t2.
Additionally, both I(Tree,Tree,Amoeba,Slide, RT, t2, t2) and
I(Amoeba,Pond,Tree,Tree, RT, t2, t2) hold according to the case. This is
because Tree is to the right of Amoeba at t2 in virtue of Amoeba being Slide at
t2, and Amoeba is to the right of Tree at t2 in virtue of Amoeba being Pond at
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t2. This satisfies both conjuncts in the antecedent of an instance of Transitivity of
RTte, we can conclude ∃x∃yI(Tree, x,Tree, y, RT, t2, t2). But there is no x and y
such that the instantiation relation holds between Tree, x, Tree, y, RT , t2, and
t2. That is to say, Tree is not to the right of itself.
This shows that Transitivity of RTte does not capture the transitivity of is to the
right of because different objects might satisfy the variables y1 and y2 bound by their
respective existential quantifiers. If identities are never occasional or contingent, this
would not be an issue. If objects were never occasionally or contingently distinct,
there would never be distinct objects to satisfy y1 and y2. However, the example
of Slide, Tree, and Pond shows us that what we might call the ‘intermediate’
object in an instance of transitivity serves as the intermediate object in virtue of
being distinct objects at t2. Amoeba serves as the intermediate object in the first
conjunct of the antecedent of an instance of Transitivity of RTte in virtue of being
Pond at t2. But then it serves as the intermediate object in the second conjunct
of the antecedent of Transitivity of RTte in virtue, not of being Pond, but of being
Slide at t2.
To properly formulate a transitivity principle for is to the right of, we need to
bind the pair y1 and y2 to a single existential quantifier. Here is such a formulation:
Transitivity of RTte*:
∀x∀y∀z∀t[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1, RT, t, t) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1, RT, t, t)]
→ ∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2, RT, t, t)]31
31 It might be suggested that we should also bind x1 and x2 to the same quantifier, and further,
bind z1 and z2 to the same quantifier. Although I do not think a counterexample demonstrating
the inadequacy of this current formulation is forthcoming, I do not see why such a reformulation
that binds those variables would be objectionable.
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This reformulation says, for all objects x, y, and z, and for all times t, when there
exists objects x1, y1, and z1 such that (i) the instantiation relation holds between x,
x1, y, y1, the relation is to the right of, t, and t, and (ii) the instantiation relation
holds between y, y1, z, z1, the relation is to the right of, t, and t, then there exists
objects x2 and z2 such that the instantiation relation holds between x, x2, z, z2, the
relation is to the right of, t, t.
This formulation allows us to make the correct inference about the
case (that, roughly speaking, Pond is to the right of Slide), without
making the incorrect one (that, roughly speaking, Tree is to the right
of Tree). This is because I(Pond,Pond,Tree,Tree, RT, t2, t2) and
I(Tree,Tree,Slide,Slide, RT, t2, t2) hold and satisfy the antecedent of an
instance of Transitivity of RTte*, and I(Pond,Pond,Slide,Slide, RT, t2, t2)
holds, which satisfies the consequent of that instance of Transitiv-
ity of RTte*. However, I(Tree,Tree,Amoeba,Slide, RT, t2, t2) and
I(Amoeba,Pond,Tree,Tree, RT, t2, t2) do not satisfy the antecedent of
Transitivity of RTte* because Slide and Pond are distinct objects. This prevents
the inference to I(Tree,Tree,Tree,Tree, RT, t2, t2).
2.5.2 Generalization
Transitivity of RTte* suggests the general form that transitivity principles ought to
take given the expanded notion of instantiation. Here are the schemas for the temporal
and modal versions of transitivity where ‘R’ is the relation in question:
Transitivity of Rte*:
∀x∀y∀z∀t[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1, R, t, t) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1, R, t, t)]→
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∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2, R, t, t)]
Transitivity of Rwe*:
∀x∀y∀z∀w[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1, R, w, w) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1, R, w, w)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2, R, w, w)]
Transitivity of Rte* says that, for all objects x, y, and z, and for all times t,
when there exists objects x1, y1, and z1 such that (i) the instantiation relation holds
between x, x1, y, y1, the relation R, t, and t, and (ii) the instantiation relation holds
between y, y1, z, z1, the relation R, t, and t, then there exists objects x2 and z2 such
that the instantiation relation holds between x, x2, z, z2, the relation R, t, t.
Similarly, Transitivity of Rwe* says that, for all objects x, y, and z, and for all
worlds w, when there exists objects x1, y1, and z1 such that (i) the instantiation
relation holds between x, x1, y, y1, the relation R, w, and w, and (ii) the instantiation
relation holds between y, y1, z, z1, the relation R, w, and w, then there exists objects
x2 and z2 such that the instantiation relation holds between x, x2, z, z2, the relation
R, w, w.
With the general forms of transitivity, we can specify the temporal and modal
reformulation of Transitivity of Identity as follows.
Transitivity of Identityte*:
∀x∀y∀z∀t[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1,=, t, t) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1,=, t, t)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2,=, t, t)]
Transitivity of Identitywe*:
∀x∀y∀z∀w[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1,=, w, w) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1,=, w, w)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2,=, w, w)]
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Transitivity of Identityte* says that, for all objects x, y, and z, and for all times
t, when there exists objects x1, y1, and z1 such that (i) the instantiation relation
holds between x, x1, y, y1, identity, t, and t, and (ii) the instantiation relation holds
between y, y1, z, z1, identity, t, and t, then there exists objects x2 and z2 such that
the instantiation relation holds between x, x2, z, z2, identity, t, t.
Similarly, Transitivity of Identitywe* says that, for all objects x, y, and z, and for
all worlds w, when there exists objects x1, y1, and z1 such that (i) the instantiation
relation holds between x, x1, y, y1, identity, w, and w, and (ii) the instantiation
relation holds between y, y1, z, z1, identity, w, and w, then there exists objects x2
and z2 such that the instantiation relation holds between x, x2, z, z2, identity, w, w.
The next section shows how these reformulations of Transitivity of Identity based
on the expanded notion of instantiation provide a reply to Bader’s objections to
Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity.
2.6 Replying to Bader
Recall Bader’s objections to Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity, respectively:
3.1. ∀x∀y∀z∀t[( at t : x = y ∧ at t: y = z)→ at t : x = z] (assumption for reductio).
3.2. at t1 : a = c ∧ at t1: c = e ∧ at t1 : a 6= e (from the case)
3.3. (at t1 : a = c ∧ at t1: c = e)→ at t1 : a = e (instance of 3.1).
3.4. at t1 : a = e ∧ at t1 : a 6= e (from 3.2 and 3.3, a contradiction).




4.1. ∀x∀y∀z∀w[( at w : x = y ∧ at w: y = z) → at w : x = z] (assumption for
reductio).
4.2. at w1 : a = c ∧ at w1: c = e ∧ at w1 : a 6= e (from the case).
4.3. (at w1: a = c ∧ at w1: c = e) → at w1 : a = e (instance of 4.1).
4.4. at w1 : a = e ∧ at w1: a 6= e (from 4.2 and 4.3, a contradiction).
4.5. ¬∀x∀y∀z∀w[( at w : x = y ∧ at w: y = z) → at w : x = z] (the negation of
Transitivity of Identityw).
Here they are formulated with Transitivity of Identityte* and Transitivity of Identitywe*
and the expanded five-place instantiation relation.
3.1* ∀x∀y∀z∀t[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1,=, t, t) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1,=, t, t)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2,=, t, t)] (assumption for reductio).
3.2* I(a, b, c, b,=, t1, t1) ∧ I(c, d, e, d,=, t1, t1) ∧ ¬∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, t1, t1) (from the
case).
3.3* ∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(a, x1, c, y1,=, t1, t1) ∧ I(c, y1, e, z1,=, t1, t1)]→
∃x2∃z2I(a, x2, e, z2,=, t1, t1) (an instance of 3.1*).
3.4* ∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, t1, t1)∧¬∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, t1, t1) (from 3.2* and 3.3*, a con-
tradiction).
3.5* ¬∀x∀y∀z∀t[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1,=, t, t) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1,=, t, t)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2,=, t, t)] (the negation of Transitivity of Identityte*).
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and
4.1* ∀x∀y∀z∀w[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1,=, w, w) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1,=, w, w)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2,=, w, w)] (assumption for reductio).
4.2* I(a, b, c, b,=, w1, w1)∧ I(c, d, e, d,=, w1, w1)∧¬∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, w1, w1) (from
the case).
4.3* ∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(a, x1, c, y1,=, w1, w1) ∧ I(c, y1, e, z1,=, w1, w1)]→
∃x2∃z2I(a, x2, e, z2,=, w1, w1) (an instance of 4.1*).
4.4* ∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, w1, w1) ∧ ¬∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, w1, w1) (from 4.2* and 4.3*, a
contradiction)
4.5* ¬∀x∀y∀z∀w[∃x1∃y1∃z1[I(x, x1, y, y1,=, w, w) ∧ I(y, y1, z, z1,=, w, w)]→
∃x2∃z2I(x, x2, z, z2,=, w, w)] (the negation of Transitivity of Identitywe*.)
The arguments with the reformulated versions of the Transitivity of Identity are
not valid. In particular, the inference from lines 2 and 3 to line 4 in each is not valid.
This is because the first two conjuncts in lines 2 do not make the antecedent in line
3 true. This is because b and d are not the same at t1 or w1, and thereby cannot
thereby satisfy the variable y1 bound by the second existential quantifier in line 3.
Here are lines 3.2* and 4.2* repeated with the distinct objects b and b bolded to show
that they cannot satisfy the variable y1:
3.2* I(a, b, c,b,=, t1, t1) ∧ I(c,d, e, d,=, t1, t1) ∧ ¬∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, t1, t1)
4.2* I(a, b, c,b,=, w1, w1) ∧ I(c,d, e, d,=, w1, w1) ∧ ¬∃x∃zI(a, x, e, z,=, w1, w1)
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While the second conjunct in each line 4 is true, the first is not.
The second simply follows from the case in which we assume there are no objects
x and z such that the instantiation relation holds between a, x, e, z, identity, t1 or w1,
and t1 or w1. Roughly, there are no objects in virtue of which a and e are identical
at t1 or w2.
The first says that there are objects x and z such that the instantiation relation
holds between a, x, e, z, identity, t1 or w1, and t1 or w1. But as we have seen,
we cannot infer this from instances of Transitivity of Identityte* and Transitivity of
Identitywe* because the antecedents of those conditionals are not satisfied. So, no
contradictions are derived.
The reformulations expose how Bader’s objections worked. They trade one iden-
tity in the first conjunct of the antecedents in transitivity principles for another
identity in the second conjunct. These formulations force the identities to be the
same.
To respond to Bader’s objections, defenders of Occasional Identity and Contingent
Identity should adopt the reformulations of Transitivity of Identity I have proposed.32
Reformulating Principles of Identity is consistent with the strategy that Gallois has
already employed to respond to objections to his view. Further, they are formulated
in light of his own views about property instantiation and about temporally and
modally indexed properties. Bader is right to point out that the formulations of tran-
sitivity that he considers are inadequate given the possibility of simultaneous fissions
and fusion. However, he has failed to show that Occasional Identity and Contingent
32 Moreover, they ought to, in light of the discussion of is to the right of, formulate all transitivity
principles using the expanded notion of instantiation.
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Identity theorists cannot provide adequate reformulations of the Transitivity of Iden-
tity. Arguably, there are many theoretical costs for adopting Occasional Identity and
Contingent Identity, but inadequacy of reformulating Transitivity of Identity is not
among them.
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Chapter 3: Indeterminate Identity and Ghost Ships
Recall that Indeterminate Identity is the view that it is possible that it is indeter-
minate that the identity relation holds of some objects (see Chapter 1, §1.2.2). As
explained earlier (see Chapter 1, §1.5.1), Indeterminate Identity has been advanced
as a view that provides a solution to classic puzzles about identity like Ship of
Theseus. The solution is a Principle-Rejecting Strategy. In §3.1, I present how pro-
ponents of Indeterminate Identity solve the puzzle. In §3.2, I present an overlooked
consequence of the solution. In §3.3, I argue that this consequence leads to unintuitive
results.
3.1 Solving Ship of Theseus
3.1.1 Ship of Theseus
Ship of Theseus, introduced in Chapter 1, §1.5.1, is a puzzle about identity when
parts are replaced. For simplicity, we can imagine that every part of a ship, called
Original Ship, is a plank and that planks are replaced one each day until the ship
is made entirely of replacement planks. This ship was named Replacement Ship.
Further, the case has us imagine that a distinct ship was constructed from the original
planks. This ship was called Reassembly Ship.
The puzzle is generated by accepting the following intuitions:
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Replacement Survival Objects like a ship can survive the replacement of a single
part. That is, by replacing one part, there is not a distinct object that comes
into existence.
Reassembly Survival Objects like a ship can survive the disassembling and re-
assembling of their parts. That is, by rearranging the parts of an object and
putting them back into their original arrangement, a new object does not come
into existence.1,2
These cannot both be true, because Original Ship cannot simultaneously be
identical to two distinct ships at the end.
Alternatively, one might have the intuition that there is no good answer to the
question: which ship is Original Ship identical to? It is this intuition that Terence
Parsons and Peter Woodruff think that they capture by proposing both that it is
indeterminate that Original Ship is identical to Reassembly Ship and that it is
1 There is a question about what to say of the object after disassembly, but before reassembly. I
think that one could say at least two things. One thing to say is that the object goes out of
existence and later comes back into existence. Another thing to say is that the object exists as
a scattered object.
When presented by Parsons (2000, §1), these intuitions are classified as judgements that we
tend to make about these types of cases. Later Parsons presents a methodological constraint
on the Indeterminate Identity project. He says that he will “begin with ordinary beliefs, which
I will reject only if some reason is found to challenge them” (p. 6). It is unclear if rejecting
the intuitions I have identified necessarily runs up against this methodological constraint. The
reason is that, if the Indeterminate Identity solution to the puzzle is true, then one might not be
required to reject them in a strong sense. That is, one might think that it is indeterminate that
the intuitions are true, even if one thinks that they are not determinately true.
2 By saying that Original Ship is identical to the Reassembly Ship and distinct from Replace-
ment Ship, one accepts Reassembly Survival and rejects Replacement Survival. By saying that
Original Ship is identical to the ship Replacement Ship and distinct from Reassembly
Ship, one accepts Replacement Survival and rejects Reassembly Survival. By saying that Orig-
inal Ship is distinct from both ships, one rejects both intuitions. This last position might be
motivated by thinking that there is no reason to prefer one intuition over the other.
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is indeterminate that Original Ship is identical to Reassembly Ship (Woodruff
and Parsons 1995, p. 172). Ship of Theseus is one of several puzzles for which
they think that the view can provide solutions.3 In the following subsections, I briefly
present the logic that accompanies their defense of Indeterminate Identity before
showing their solution to the puzzle.
3.1.2 Indeterminate Identity
Indeterminate Identity (at least the view advanced by Parsons and Woodruff)4 is a
view on which the world is such that it might be indeterminate that some object is
identical to another.5 The view is also committed to the following claims:
Indeterminate States of Affairs Possibly there is a state of affairs such that
it is indeterminate that the state of affairs holds.
Indeterminate Instantiation Possibly there is an object and a property such
that it is indeterminate that the object instantiates the property.6
3 See Parsons (2000, §1.4) for a list of puzzles.
4 The view is first defended by Parsons (1987). Subsequent defenses of the view are given by
Woodruff and Parsons (1995, 1997, 1999). Later, Parsons (2000) gives the most extensive defense
of the view. Because it is the most recent and thorough defense, most references will be to the
version of Indeterminate Identity articulated there.
5 It is not the view that explains all indeterminacy about identity in terms of our epistemic position
as to whether or not some things are identical (Parsons 2000, §2.7). The indeterminacy is
metaphysical, not merely epistemic.
6 Additionally, Parsons argues that his account of Indeterminate Identity ought to be contrasted
with views on which identity is vague. He gives several reasons for this (Parsons 2000, §2.7).
Some of these reasons suggest that the distinction is useful only insofar as it prevents others
from attributing to him claims commonly associated with vagueness. Here, I do not address the
question as to whether there is a substantive or merely verbal distinction to be made.
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Following Parsons, ‘!’ is the determinate operator and ‘O’ is the indeterminate
operator.7 Where Φ is a sentence expressing a proposition:
‘!Φ’ expresses that it is determinate that Φ,
‘!¬Φ’ expresses that it is determinate that not Φ, and
‘OΦ’ expresses that it is indeterminate that Φ.
Indeterminacy can be defined in terms of determinacy.
OΦ =df ¬!Φ ∧ ¬!¬Φ (read “it is indeterminate that Φ just in case it is neither
determinate that Φ nor determinate that not Φ.”)
And with objects a and b:
‘!(a = b)’ expresses that it is determinate that a is identical to b,
‘!¬(a = b)’ expresses that it is determinate that a and b are distinct, and
‘O(a = b)’ expresses that it is indeterminate that a is identical to b.
The form of Leibniz’s Law accepted by Indeterminate Identity theorists is the
following biconditional:
!(a = b)↔ ∀F !(Fa↔ Fb).8
7 What follows is adapted from the logic and semantics for Indeterminate Identity given by Parsons
(2000, Chap. 2).
8 This presentation departs somewhat from Parsons’s presentation. He reserves the term ‘Leibniz’s
Law’ for the related substitution rule in the left-to-right direction of the biconditional (Parsons
2000, Chap. 2, §6). However, he accepts this biconditional as a definition of determinate identity
(Parsons 2000, Chap. 2, §3).
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That is, Indeterminate Identity theorists claim that two objects are determinately
identical just in case, for all properties, it is determinate that one object has that
property exactly when the other does.
Given the semantics for conditionals, it will be the case that two objects are
indeterminately identical just in case it is indeterminate that they share the same
properties.9 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, §1.4.1, the coherence of Indeterminate
Identity has been debated. While here I assume the view is coherent, I raise concerns
about its empirical adequacy.
3.1.3 The Solution
The solution that Parsons (2000, pp. 42–3) presents is the following:
1. !¬(Replacement Ship = Reassembly Ship)
2. O(Replacement Ship = Original Ship)
3. O(Original Ship = Reassembly Ship)
According to 1, Replacement Ship and Reassembly Ship are determinately
distinct. According to 2, it is indeterminate that Original Ship is identical to
9 It is more precise to say: It is indeterminate that two objects are identical just in case it is
indeterminate that they share and lack the same properties. For example, when, for objects A
and B, (i) they have all the same properties, except for property P, (ii) A has P, and (iii) it is
indeterminate that B does, they are indeterminately identical. Similarly, when, for objects A
and B, (i) they have all the same properties, except for property P, (ii) A lacks P, (iii) and it is
indeterminate that B does, they are indeterminately identical. For readability, in what follows I
will take ‘indeterminately identical’ to mean ‘it is indeterminate that two objects are identical’,
and ‘indeterminate that they share the same properties’ to mean ‘indeterminate that they share
and lack the same properties’. See Parsons 2000, Chap. 3 for a thorough presentation of the
Indeterminate Identity theorist’s version of Leibniz’s Law. See Parsons 2000, Chap. 2, §4 for the
semantics of the conditional.
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Replacement Ship. According to 3, it is indeterminate that Original Ship is
identical to Reassembly Ship. Here I grant that this is a coherent solution to the
puzzle.
I note two things about the solution before moving on to the argument regarding,
what I will call, the Ghost Ships.
First, the Indeterminate Identity theorist reformulates Transitivity of Identity.
According to the Indeterminate Identity theorist, the following principle is true:
∀x∀y∀z[(!(x = y)∧!(y = z))→!(x = z)]
That is, they hold that, for all objects, if it is determinate that one object is
identical to a second and it is determinate that the second object is identical to a
third object, then it is determinate that the first object is identical to the third. But
the Indeterminate Identity theorist does not think the following principle holds:
∀x∀y∀z[(O(x = y) ∧ O(y = z))→ O(x = z)]
That is, they do not hold that, for all objects, if it is indeterminate that one object
is identical to second and it is indeterminate that the second object is identical a third
object, then it is indeterminate that the first object is identical to the third object.
Otherwise 2 and 3 would imply that it is indeterminate that Replacement Ship is
identical to Reassembly Ship. This would contradict 1.10
Second, there are no planks with respect to which Original Ship and Replace-
ment Ship determinately differ. Although this might strike some as obviously false,
10 See Parsons 2000, p. 37, pp. 42–3 for more on transitivity.
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it follows directly from the proposed solution to the puzzle. When things are indeter-
minately identical, it is indeterminate that they share all the same properties. This
means that they cannot determinately differ on some property. The solution does not
say that at the beginning of the replacement process, say t0, that Original Ship has
all the planks that are part of Replacement Ship at the end, say at t1000. Rather, it
is says of Original Ship that, at t1000, for each plank Replacement Ship determi-
nately has at t1000, it is indeterminate that Original Ship has that plank. Similarly,
but in reverse, for Replacement Ship. The solution says of Replacement Ship
that, at t0, for each plank Original Ship determinately has at t0, it is indeterminate
that Replacement Ship has that plank. To claim that there exists a plank with
respect to which Original Ship and Replacement Ship determinately differ is
to reject the solution proposed by Indeterminate Identity theorists, and perhaps to
question or reject Indeterminate Identity altogether.11
3.2 Ghost Ships
In this section I present an overlooked implication of this solution to the puzzle.
The implication is what the solution says for ships between Original Ship and
Replacement Ship. Let these be the ghost ships.12
Recall that planks are replaced one each day. For precision, let us stipulate that
the ship is made of 1,000 planks. Let us rename the ships to correspond to how many
11 A previous formulation of this interpreted the claim about whether the ships shared the other’s
planks as a case in which it was indeterminate whether they shared all of the other’s planks.
Thank you to Julia Jorati for identifying this error.
12 The name is due to Ben Caplan.
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replacement planks they have as parts. So let Original Ship be Ship0 and Re-
placement Ship be Ship1000. Thus far, the ghost ships (Ship1, Ship2, ..., Ship999)
have been ignored.13
For pairs of ghost ships Shipn and Shipn+1 for n between 0 and 999 we can ask
if these pairs are determinately identical, determinately distinct, or indeterminately
identical? I provide an argument for why Parsons should opt for the third option. I
first present it informally, then I present it formally, and finally I elaborate on some
steps in the argument.
Recall that one type of solution that I identified in §1.5.1 was Privileged Change
Counts. There I distinguished the Indeterminate Identity solution to the puzzle from
Privileged Change Counts strategies. Below I argue below that the Indeterminate
Identity theorist ought to reject the existence of a privileged plank. Without a privi-
leged plank, the identity facts for each sequential pair of ghost ships generalizes.
Without a privileged plank, it is either the case that (i) every sequential pair is
determinately identical, (ii) every sequential pair is determinately distinct, or (iii)
every sequential pair is indeterminately identical. If every sequential pair is determi-
nately identical, then, by the transitivity of determinate identity, Ship0 and Ship1000
are, contrary to the proposed solution, determinately identical.14 If every sequential
pair is determinately distinct, then, by Leibniz’s Law, they differ with respect to at
least one property. This would imply, as argued below, that there is at least one
13 This is not to say that there are 1001 numerically distinct ships involved. According to Inde-
terminate Identity, it is indeterminate how many ships there are. For more on counting and
indeterminate identity, see Parsons 2000, Chap. 8.
14 This is because Ship0 is Original Ship and Replacement Ship is Ship1000, and the proposed
solution is that it is indeterminate that Original Ship and Replacement Ship are identical,
not that it is determinate that they are identical.
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property with respect to which Ship0 and Ship1000 differ. However, this contradicts
the assumption that, by the Indeterminate Identity version of Leibniz’s Law, it is
indeterminate that they have all properties in common. Thus, the Indeterminate
Identity theorist should accept that each sequential pair is indeterminately identical.
Here is a formal version of this argument:
1. O Ship0 = Ship1000 (the Indeterminate Identity theorist’s solution to the puz-
zle).
2. There is no privileged plank.
3. For arbitrary n between 0 and 999, either !(Shipn = Shipn+1), !¬(Shipn =
Shipn+1), or O(Shipn = Shipn+1).
4. Assume for reductio: !(Shipn = Shipn+1).
5. By 2 and 4, every sequential pair in the series is determinately identical.
6. By 5 and the transitivity of determinate identity, for every n, m such that
0 ≤ n ≤ 100 and 0 ≤ m ≤ 1000, !(Shipn = Shipm). That is, every pair
(sequential or not) in the series is determinately identical.
7. By 6, !(Ship0 = Ship1000).
8. 7 contradicts 1.
9. From 4–8, ¬!(Shipn = Shipn+1).
10. Assume for reductio: !¬(Shipn = Shipn+1).
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11. By Leibniz’s Law and 10, there is some property on which Shipn and
Shipn+1 determinately disagree.
15
12. From the case and 11, Shipn and Shipn+1 intrinsically only differ with
respect to a pair of planks.
13. From 12, Shipn and Shipn+1 determinately differ with respect to having
the pair of planks.16
14. From a plausible interpretation of the case17 and 13, Ship0 and Ship1000
also determinately differ with respect to this pair of planks.
15. From 1, there is no pair of planks on which Ship0 and Ship1000 determi-
nately differ.18
16. Contradiction between 14 and 15.
17. From 10–16, ¬!¬(Shipn = Shipn+1).
18. Therefore, from 3, 9, and 17, for arbitrary n between 0 and 999, O(Shipn =
Shipn+1).
I will now comment on the steps in the argument.
15 This is to say that there is some property such that either Shipn determinately has it and Shipn+1
determinately lacks it, or Shipn determinately lacks it and Shipn+1 determinately has it.
16 That is, one of the planks is such that one ship determinately has it while the other determinately
lacks it, and the other plank is such that the other ship determinately has it while the one
determinately lacks it.
17 This is articulated below.
18 See subsection 3.1.3 above for the explanation of why this is the case.
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First, at 9 and 17 the argument relies on a version of indirect proof that is valid for
the non-classical logic accompanying Indeterminate Identity (Parsons 2000, p. 24).
I take 2 to be an implicit assumption of the Indeterminate Identity’s solution to
Ship of Theseus. If there were planks that made a difference for the identity of the
ship, then one could appeal to these privileged planks to explain why at some point in
the replacement process Theseus has a new ship that is determinately distinct from
his original ship. That is, one could provide a Privileged Change Counts solution to
the puzzle. An Indeterminate Identity theorist could accept the existence of privileged
planks and still appeal to Indeterminate Identity in solving the puzzle. However, this
reduces the extent to which the ability to provide a solution to the puzzle justifies
denying Determinacy of Identity. This is because, on this proposal, the falsity of
Determinacy of Identity does not fully explain the data from Ship of Theseus. It
requires adopting Privileged Change Counts as well.
The truth of 3 is not obvious without reflecting on the non-classical logic accom-
panying the theory of Indeterminate Identity, a logic that rejects the Law of the
Excluded Middle (Parsons 2000, p. 25). In classical logic, a proposition might be
either true or false. But, according to Indeterminate Identity, it might have an inde-
terminate truth status (that is, be neither true nor false).19 I understand 3 to be the
Indeterminate Identity analog of the Law of the Excluded Middle. Because it might
be indeterminate that a state of affairs holds, I take it that it is a logical truth for the
Indeterminate Identity theorist that, for any state of affairs, it determinately obtains,
19 So strictly speaking, the logic Parsons adopts for Indeterminate Identity is bivalent; there are
only two truth values. But, according to him, propositions might have the truth status of lacking
a truth value. See Parsons 2000, §2.4 for more on this. Even if this distinction between truth
values and statuses is illusory, I think that my contention, that Indeterminate Identity theorists
ought to hold an analog of the Law of the Excluded Middle, stands.
84
it determinately fails to obtain, or it is indeterminate that it obtains. By eliminating
two of the three possible truth statuses for a given proposition, one can validly infer
the remaining status.
Steps 4–9 eliminate the possibility that every sequential pair is determinately
identical. The steps show that, if one assumed this, then, contrary to the proposed
solution, Original Ship would be determinately identical to Replacement Ship.
Steps 10–17 attempt to make explicit what I take to be a highly implausible
position to hold about the puzzle. Given the assumption that there is no privileged
plank, if any sequential pair in the series of ships is such that they are determinately
distinct, then all sequential pairs are. It would be implausible to claim that all these
pairs were determinately distinct, yet the ship at the beginning of the series was
indeterminately identical to the ship at the end.20
To summarize, with respect to identity no plank is privileged and thus each se-
quential pair has structurally similar identity facts. Sequential pairs cannot be de-
terminately identical with one another. Otherwise Ship0 and Ship1000 would be
determinately identical by transitivity. Sequential pairs cannot be determinately dis-
tinct from one another. Otherwise it would be highly implausible to maintain that
Ship0 and Ship1000 are indeterminately identical. Therefore, each sequential pair of
ghost ships, of which there are many, must be indeterminately identical.
20 Abstracted away from the particulars of the case, it seems logically possible to hold this view.
However, since the only intrinsic difference between sequential ships is the having of two planks
(the one that is removed and the one that replaces it), the only good candidate properties on
which the ships can determinately differ are the properties of possessing these planks. This is
captured in the moves in 11–13. This would suggest that Ship0 and Ship1000 also determinately
differ in this respect (this is step 14). But, according to the case, Ship0 and Ship1000 cannot
determinately differ with respect to the planks that they have (at most it can be indeterminate
that they differ). This is the contradiction between 14 and 15.
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One might have assumed that the Indeterminate Identity solution presents only
two pairs of ships that are indeterminately identical. In fact, there are many pairs
of indeterminately identical ships that are easy to overlook. Let the fact that pairs
of ghost ships (that is, the ships between Ship0 and Ship1000) are indeterminately
identical be called ghostliness.21
3.3 Consequences
3.3.1 What Makes Ghost Ships Ghostly?
No reassembly required
Here I will argue that it is not necessary that the original planks be reassembled into
a ship in order for the ghost ships to be indeterminately identical. Let us return to
the puzzle case. Imagine that in possible world A, depicted in Figure 3.1, the case
proceeds as previously described (see Chapter 1, §1.5.1), except that the ships are
located in named harbors. The ship made of original planks at the beginning of the
case, Original Ship, was in Original Harbor. The ship made of replacement
planks at the end of the case, Replacement Ship, is in Nearby Harbor. The
ship made of reassembled original planks at the end of the case, Reassembly Ship is
in Faraway Harbor. Now imagine that in possible world B, depicted in Figure 3.2,
the replacement process is completed, but there is no reassembly of the original planks
into a ship. At most there is a scattered object that is composed of original planks
















Figure 3.1: World A
that are not arranged ship-wise.22
I maintain that the ghostly ships in world B are just as ghostly as they are in
world A. There is a temptation to understand the story in world B differently than
in world A. One might argue that what makes Ship of Theseus so puzzling is not
necessarily the sorites-like series of plank replacements. Rather, one might argue that
the case is problematic in virtue of the existence of the second ship, Reassembly
Ship, made of original planks.
If this is true, then one could say that, in the absence of Reassembly Ship,
ghostly ships are not ghostly after all. That is, in the absence of Reassembly Ship,
the replacement of a plank makes no difference in the identity of the ships. According












Figure 3.2: World B
to this view, any sequential pair of ships are actually determinately identical to one
another. As a consequence, Original Ship and Replacement Ship would be
determinately identical.
The problem with this view is that it makes identity extrinsic.23 To maintain
the view, one must accept that some facts about identity are determined by facts
about the existence or non-existence objects at distant times and places. It makes
the facts about whether ghost ships are ghostly dependent on whether or not the
original planks ever come together to make a ship.
To see the implausibility of such a proposal, imagine that world B′, depicted in
Figure 3.3, is like world B (the world where reassembly has not occurred) except
23 This diagnosis of the case also comes from Gallois (1998, pp. 50–60).
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that years have passed since the replacement process. Replacement Ship is still
in Nearby Harbor. Someone discovers the the original planks, now in Faraway
Harbor, and decides to arrange them ship-wise. When she is done, worlds A and
B are brought to congruence with respect to the identity facts about the ships. This
is because it would be implausible to think that the sequential pairs of ships were
identical during the time before our shipbuilder happened upon the original planks in
Faraway Harbor and that, after she assembled a ship with the original planks, the
identity facts about the sequential pairs changed retroactively. Not only are the ships
physically separated (Replacement Ship is in Nearby Harbor and Reassembly
Ship in Faraway Harbor), the reassembly of the original planks occurs years later.
Why should the identity facts about ships depend on facts about the rearrangement
of planks years in the future? Thus, even in world B, the ships are ghostly.
No original planks required
One might concede that it is not the existence of Reassembly Ship that makes Ship
of Theseus a puzzle, but rather argue that the existence of the planks does. This
would be to maintain that, had the original planks not been saved, sequential pairs
of ghost ships would be determinately identical. In this case, as above, this would
mean that Original Ship was determinately identical to Replacement Ship.
To test whether the existence of the planks is what explains the ghostliness of the
ghost ships, let us imagine a world, world C (depicted in Figure 3.4), where the planks
are destroyed as they are replaced. The destruction cannot merely be a scattering
of the underlying matter. This is because the scattered matter could be arranged















































Figure 3.5: World C ′
world C like world B′, but with smaller ship parts. To take the suggestion that
ghostliness depends on the existence of the planks, the matter needs to be destroyed
as depicted in Figure 3.4. Since in world C there are no planks and none of the matter
with which to reconstruct the planks, one might maintain that in this world there is
nothing puzzling about replacing planks. After each replacement the ship maintains
its identity through the entire replacement process.
My response is to argue that the non-existence of the planks does not actually
make a difference to ghostliness. Imagine world C ′, depicted in Figure 3.5. World C ′
is like world C, except that some time has passed. Instead of a shipbuilder stumbling
upon the planks and constructing a ship, God restores the original planks’s existence.
It is implausible that there is a difference in ghostliness between worlds C and C ′.
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If there was, this would mean that the identity facts about sequential pairs depend
on facts about what matter will exist in the future. So the sequential ghost ships in
world C ′ are indeterminately identical even when the original planks cease to exist.
From these cases I have argued that the fact that sequential pairs of ghost ships are
indeterminately identical, their ghostliness, depends neither on the existence of the
ship made of original planks, nor on the existence of the original planks themselves.
The ghost ships are ghostly regardless. Next I will argue that their ghostliness does
not depend even on the replacement process.
Do the ghost ships need the replacement ship?
One might concede that what is strange about Ship of Theseus is not the possibility
of a ship made of the original planks in addition to the ship made of the replacement
planks. Rather, it is just the sorites-like series that moves from a ship made up of
one collection of planks to a ship made of entirely different planks. What I will argue
is that this series, as explained by the Indeterminate Identity theorist, is actually a
conjunction of instances of a more general phenomenon.
Again, world A is the world in which the replacement process proceeds as described
in the puzzle.24 Let world D, depicted in figure Figure 3.6, be just like world A except
that at some point in the replacement process Theseus stops replacing planks. If what
makes Ship of Theseus unique is the totality of the replacement process, then we
should expect that the relevant identity facts between world A and world D diverge.
The most plausible proposal is that in world D the replacement of planks does not
make a difference in the identity of the ship, whereas in world A it does. This would
24 Here the details of what happens to the original planks can be ignored.
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mean that sequential pairs of ghost ships in world D are determinately identical,
whereas they are indeterminately identical in world A.
However, this would imply that, at every point of replacement, the identity facts
about the ship before and the ship after the replacement depend on future identity
facts. Take any sequential pair of ghost ships Shipn and Shipn+1 in world D. They
appear to individually instantiate all the same properties in D that they do in A.
That is, Shipn in world D appears to be qualitatively identical to Shipn in world A.
The same is true of Shipn+1. This is because the worlds are the same until some
point in the future when the replacement process stops in world D but continues in
world A.
But, if the identity facts about the ghost ships depend, as the present proposal
suggests, on the totality of the replacement process, then there must be a difference
in instantiation facts before the replacement stops in world D. This is because in
world A, as I argued in section 3.2 above, the Indeterminate Identity theorist should
maintain that it is indeterminate that Shipn and Shipn+1 are identical. This means,
by Leibniz’s Law, that there is at least one property on which it is indeterminate if
they differ in world A. But because Shipn and Shipn+1 are supposedly determinately
identical in world D, by Leibniz’s Law, they determinately instantiate all the same
properties. So the instantiation facts between world A and world D, at the time
before the worlds diverge, must differ.
But what instantiation facts could be different between the worlds at this point?
The only relevant difference between the worlds has to do with future identity facts.
But, as we have seen in Chapter 1, §1.4.1, Indeterminate Identity theorists like Par-








Figure 3.6: World D
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Indeterminate Identity theorist cannot say in response to Evans’s objection that prop-
erties like is an x such that x is indeterminately identical to a are illegitimate, but
use them to argue that the identity facts between worlds A and D differ before the
replacement stops in world D.25
If I am right about the consequences of the Indeterminate Identity theorist’s so-
lution, then the replacement of a single plank makes for an indeterminate difference.
By this I mean that, for any sequential pair, Shipn and Shipn+1, if they differ with
respect to just one plank, then O(Shipn = Shipn+1). Thus, the fact that the ghost
ships are indeterminately identical does not depend on the nature of the entire sorites
series, but on the having and lacking of individual planks.
3.3.2 Generalization
That individual planks make for an indeterminate difference generalizes to the result
that, according to the Indeterminate Identity theorist, a change in a single part
makes for an indeterminate difference. This is because there is nothing special about
planks or ship construction that prevents one from applying the structure of Ship of
Theseus to other types of objects. The story could have been told about things such
25 In addition, on this proposal one is faced with a inter-world sorites series. World D is just one
of many, at least 1000, ways in which the replacement process might have differed from the
replacement process in world A. For example, world D′ could be the world where only one plank
was ever replaced, world D′′ the world where only two planks were ever replaced, etc. There is
now a question of when in that series of worlds, or classes of worlds, the identity facts diverge
from world A. Once someone determines at which world in the sorites series the divergence
occurs, my argument can be run substituting that world for world D in the argument. Thanks
to Evan Woods for pointing out this result. See Sider 2001, Chap. 4, §9.1 for a formulation of
the argument from vagueness in terms of a modal sorites series.
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as cars, buildings, chairs, humans, and coffee mugs.26 This means that for a whole
host of objects, according to Indeterminate Identity, any time that there is a change
in a part, the object before the change is indeterminately identical to the object after
the change. But, if some basic scientific facts hold, this happens quite often with
most objects. Minor physical contact between objects can make it such that some
molecules are no longer parts of object or make it such that new molecules become
parts of an object. According to the Indeterminate Identity theorist, what is going
on in Ship of Theseus is not a unique philosophical puzzle, but rather a pervasive
phenomenon.
I anticipate three objections. First, it might be objected that I conflated replace-
ment of parts with adding and losing parts. I have two replies to this.
First, even if I concede that replacement-of-part events are sufficiently different
from addition-of-part or loss-of-part events, there remain many cases of replacement.
For instance, I replace various parts of my bicycle periodically. If the phenomenon of
ghostly ships generalizes, then by replacing my bicycle chain the bicycle before the
replacement is indeterminately identical to the bicycle after the replacement. This is
a surprising result and we can imagine many structurally similar cases for otherwise
ordinary replacement of parts.
Second, it is not obvious how different these events actually are. Consider a loss-of-
part event. While not actually a replacement-of-part event, it could be. A part could
have been added to replace the lost part. In the possible world in which a replacement-
of-part event occurred it would be indeterminate, if I am right, whether the resulting
26 An argument might be made that the identity conditions for living organisms and non-living
organisms are different, even for the Indeterminate Identity theorist. Even if we restrict the
generalization to non-living objects, the generalization captures lots of objects.
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object is identical to the pre-replacement object or not. It would be odd if the
difference between a loss-of-part and replacement-of-part made for an indeterminate
difference in identity. Similarly with an addition-of-part event. While not actually
a replacement-of-part event, it could be. A part could have been lost to replace the
added part. In the possible world in which a replacement-of-part event occurred it
would be indeterminate, if I am right, whether the resulting object is identical to the
pre-replacement object or not. It would be odd if the difference between an addition-
of-part event and replacement-of-part event made for an indeterminate difference in
identity.27
The second objection is that Parsons already anticipates that instances of indeter-
minate identity are widespread. This is because, in the case of Tibbles (introduced
in Chapter 1, §1.5.2), he thinks that the cat is indeterminately identical to numerous
cat candidates (2000, p. 43). For many ordinary objects, we have reason to think
of numerous precise collections of parts such that each is a candidate for being that
object. This is just to say that there is nothing particular to the furriness of cats
that makes them susceptible to the general problem of Tibbles. So, we should not
be surprised to find that there are more instances of things being indeterminately
identical than previously thought.
My reply is that cases like Tibbles are synchronic cases, whereas cases of changes
in parts are diachronic. This means that, although we might be surprised at the
number of cases of indeterminate identity that there are for objects at one time, we
have no reason to expect from this that there are also numerous cases of indeterminate
identity for change over time.
27 Thank you to Julia Jorati for suggesting a reply like this.
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The third objection is that one ought to welcome the pervasive nature of Inde-
terminate Identity.28 This is because the theory explains facts, not just about puzzle
cases, but about non-puzzle cases as well. Moreover, because the theory explains the
facts in a similar way, the theory is unifying.
To this I return to the methodology advanced by Parsons. Parsons presents In-
determinate Identity as an attempt to preserve as many of our ordinary beliefs as
possible and contrasts it with views that require rejecting ordinary beliefs. Speaking
of this methodology he writes
I begin with ordinary beliefs, which I will reject only if some reason is
found to challenge them. These are my tentative data: ordinary beliefs—
such as the belief that I have exactly one wife, that there is exactly one dog
in my back yard, and that exactly one ship set sail before the problematic
replacement/repair/reassembly process. I reject philosophical analyses
that contradict these judgements, telling me, for example, that I actually
have several dogs, or that there is not really any such thing as a dog—
there are only basic particles that swarm into dog-like shapes. (Parsons
2000, p. 6)
It seems that the methodological imperative to preserve these beliefs should also
apply to my belief that I when I have the same bicycle after a simple repair as I did
before. To this Parsons might reply that beliefs about identity are what he classifies as
“highly theoretical philosophical generalizations, such as ‘nothing is indeterminate’,
or ‘no two things can be in the same lace at once’, or the opposites of such views”
(Parsons 2000, p. 6). But beliefs like ‘this is the same bicycle I worked on yesterday’
are not themselves general beliefs about identity, nor it is obvious that they originate
28 Thank you to Evan Woods for raising this objection.
99
from “highly theoretical philosophical generalizations.” I contend that my bicycle
beliefs are “ordinary” in whatever sense it means for Parsons’s beliefs regarding the
cardinality of his wife, dogs, ships, and cats to be “ordinary beliefs.” Perhaps it turns
out that Indeterminate Identity is true and as a consequence bicycle maintenance
makes an indeterminate difference. However, even if this is the case, the Indeterminate
Identity theorist cannot ignore that many of our ordinary beliefs about replacing parts
must be abandoned.
Moreover, this result for the Indeterminate Identity theorist places their solution
into the same category as another solution to the puzzle: Every Change Counts.
According to this strategy, any change in parts is sufficient for a change in identity
between the object before the change and the object after the change. While Parsons
can maintain that not every change makes for a determinate difference, if I am right,
he must concede that every change makes for an indeterminate difference. Just as I
think that it would be a theoretical cost of the view if its solutions to puzzle cases
partly relied on the Privileged Change Counts strategy, it is a cost for it to rely on
an Every Change Counts strategy. The reason is that Indeterminate Identity is being
offered as a way to account for the data from Ship of Theseus. The proposal is
that one ought to pay the price of adopting a unintuitive metaphysical theses, like
Indeterminate States of Affairs and Indeterminate Instantiation, for the theoretical
benefit of explaining cases like Ship of Theseus. But, adopting an Every Change
Counts strategy already goes part way to explaining the case in the way that I argue
the Indeterminate Identity must. So the relative explanatory power Indeterminate
Identity offers over extant Every Change Counts strategies is less than one might
have thought.
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Chapter 4: Identity Pluralism
Gottlob Frege writes that
the relation of equality, by which I understand complete coincidence,
identity, can only be thought of as holding for objects, not concepts.
. . . although the relation of equality can only be thought of as holding
for objects, there is an analogous relation for concepts. Since this is a
relation between concepts I call it a second-level relation, whereas the for-
mer relation I call a first-level relation. (Frege 1892a, pp. 130–1, emphasis
mine)
In this passage, Frege maintains that the identity relation holds only between
objects and that it cannot hold between concepts. But he allows that an “analogous”
relation, a “second-level relation,” holds between concepts. To me this suggests a
pluralism with respect to identity.
Whether Frege himself ought to be categorized as an identity pluralist is an inter-
esting question, but not one addressed here. Instead, in this chapter I present what
an identity pluralism might look like. I do this by reviewing in section 4.1 pluralisms
with respect to other metaphysical concepts: existence and parthood. In section 4.2,
I review tests recently given by an ontological pluralist, Kris McDaniel, for pluralism
in general, and apply them to parthood and to identity. Finally in subsection 4.2.5,





Ontological pluralism is pluralism about existence. Here I characterize some possible
ontological pluralisms. Some have explicitly held the views they describe, while some
only gesture toward such views.
From Moore and Russell
Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore have been variously “accused” of being ontological
pluralists (Turner 2010, p. 5), said to have “(at least allegedly) defended” ontological
pluralism (Builes 2019, p. 394), or thought to be “friends of ways of being” (McDaniel
2009, p. 290). As evidence of this, consider that Moore writes
It is quite certain that two natural objects may exist; but it is equally
certain that two itself does not exist and never can. Two and two are
four. But that does not mean that either two or four exists. Yet it
certainly means something. Two is somehow, although it does not exist.
(Moore 1903, p. 161)
And Russell, having argued that there are universals, such as relations, contends that
the relation ‘north of’ does not seem to exist in the same sense in which
Edinburgh and London exist. (Russell 1912/2001, p. 56)
He goes on to suggest that, by not ‘existing at’, universals “subsist” rather than
“exist.” He writes
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We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are
in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they
exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus
thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do
not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where
‘being’ is opposed to ‘existence’ as being timeless. (Russell 1912/2001,
p. 57, emphasis original)
As above with Frege and pluralism about identity, I am not here arguing that
Moore and Russell were ontological pluralists. Rather, it is enough that the above
carves out a position in logical space that is correctly classified as an ontological
pluralism. Let Ontological PluralismMR be the view according to which (i) some
things exist in virtue of existing at a time, (ii) some things subsist in virtue of having
being (which is timeless), (iii) nothing both exists and subsists, (iv) there is no general
‘way to be’ common to things that exist and subsist, and (v) everything either exists
or subsists.
In addition to Ontological PluralismMR, there are several ontological pluralisms
in the vicinity. Here are some ways of generating them. One could agree that things
exist and subsist, but not explain the distinction in terms of temporality. That is,
one could disagree with (i–ii). One could hold that there are some things that both
exist and subsist. That is, one could disagree with (iii). One could think that there
is a ‘way to be’ that is common to things that exist and subsist. That is, one could
disagree with (iv). Additionally, one could think there are things that neither exist
nor subsist. That is, one could disagree with (v).
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From Meinong
Meinong provides an example of such a departure. In some respects his ontological
pluralism aligns with Ontological PluralismMR. He thinks that there are things that
are “real” and as such “exist,” and that there are things that “are not a part of
reality themselves” and as such “subsist” (Meinong 1904/1960, p. 79). Like Russell,
he thinks that mathematical objects are paradigmatic of subsisting objects. He writes
The form of being with which mathematics as such is occupied is never ex-
istence. In this respect, mathematics never transcend subsistence. (Meinong
1904/1960, p. 80, emphasis mine)
But he departs from Ontological PluralismMR with respect to (v). He goes on to
say
our account up to now may seem to leave room for the conjecture that
wherever existence is absent, it not only can be but must be replaced by
subsistence. . . . As we know, the figures with which geometry is concerned
do not exist. Nevertheless, their properties, and hence their [having char-
acteristics], can be established. . . . the [having characteristics] of an Ob-
ject is not affected by its [non-being]. The fact is sufficiently important to
be explicitly formulated as the principle of independence of [having char-
acteristics] from [being]. The area of applicability of this principle is best
illustrated by consideration of the following circumstance: the principle
applies, not only to Objects which do not exist in fact, but also to Objects
which could not exist because they are impossible. Not only is the much
heralded gold mountain made of gold, but the round square is as surely
round as it is square. . . . Any particular thing that isn’t real must at least
be capable fo serving as the Object for those judgments which grasp its
[non-being]. (Meinong 1904/1960, p. 82)
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I take this to mean that, according to Meinong, the categories of existence and
subsistence are not exhaustive. Because there are things that have properties, and of
which we can correctly say that they have particular properties, that neither exist or
subsist, there are things that lack being. Let Ontological PluralismM be the view
that there are things that have being, which either exist or subsist, and things that
lack being. And, as Caplan (2011, n. 33) suggests, one might even (and perhaps
Meinong did) say that in addition to lacking being, there are distinct ways of non-
being. One would be lacking being by existing if one had being. The other would be
lacking being by subsisting if one had being.
In her own defense of ways of non-being, Sara Bernstein furthers this suggestion
by articulating several “Meinongian” views. She writes that
there are many available Meinongian positions in logical space available
to the pluralist about non-being. One option is to hew very closely to the
letter of Meinong’s theory, while another option is to abandon the letter
and remain close to the spirit. Consider the unilateral pluralist who be-
lieves in one way of being, but two ways of non-being: one for impossible
things and one for merely nonexistent things. This sort of pluralist shares
a tripartite ontology of being and non-being with Meinong, as the major
ontological joints fall in very similar, and possibly identical, places. Other
pluralists might embrace the spirit of Meinongianism but fall farther from
the original view. For example, some pluralists about non-being might
take the division in nonexistent things to lie between, e.g., God and non-
God things rather than possible and impossible things. The symmetric
pluralist postulates joints in being in addition to those in non-being. How
many joints there are, and where they fall, determine whether a pluralist
is Meinongian or merely neo-Meinongian. Either way, accepting the sub-




In addition to defending ontological pluralism at the metametaphysical level,1 Kris
McDaniel has advanced positive arguments for particular ontological pluralisms. For
example, he has proposed that “almost nothings,” like holes, have “being-in” as their
way of being (McDaniel 2010a) and that there are degrees of being (McDaniel 2013).
Here I will focus on his view that there is a way of being had by occupants of space-
time regions and distinct a way of being had by space-time regions themselves. He
writes
This hybrid view will recognize (at least) two fundamental ontological
categories: the category of spacetime regions and the category of material
occupants of spacetime regions. (McDaniel 2004, p. 140)
Later, McDaniel explicitly defends his division of “two fundamental ontological
categories” as an ontological pluralism. He writes
Although for a material object to be is for it to be at some region or other,
this is not true of other entities. Unless a spatiotemporal region exists at
itself, we should not say the same thing about them. (McDaniel 2010b,
p. 704)
In fact what McDaniel (2010b, p. 704, n. 46) goes on to say about abstracta
brings his ontological pluralism in alignment with Ontological PluralismMR. But
suppose someone thought there were only the occupants of space-times regions and
space-time regions themselves, but no abstracta. Let Ontological PluralismMcD be
1 For such defenses, see McDaniel 2009, 2010b, 2017. Additionally, Turner (2010, 2012) has de-
fended ontological pluralism. See Spencer 2012 for an overview of the metametaphysical debate
concerning ontological pluralism.
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the view according to which everything exists either in virtue of being at a space-
time region or in virtue of being a space-time region itself. As above, the view can be
further specified by claims about whether such objects enjoy a general kind of being,
or about whether there are some things that enjoy a different way of being or lack a
way of being.
More Ways of Ways of Being
In the metametaphysical debate concerning ontological pluralism,2 Trenton Merricks
has argued for ontological monism. In an argument against ontological pluralism,
Merricks presents two versions of Ontological PluralismMR. Both think that concrete
objects exist1, that abstract objects exist2, that all objects either exist1 or exist2,
and that there is nothing that neither exists1 nor exists2. However, the first kind of
pluralist he considers denies that things that exist1 or exist2 exist generically. The
second kind of pluralist he considers thinks that things that exist1 and things that
exist2 share a generic kind of existence. He writes
Again, our new . . . pluralists think that everything generically exists. They
could take generically existing to be as fundamental as existing1 and
existing2. Or they could take generically existing to be less fundamen-
tal than (to be grounded in) existing1 and existing2. This second option
should not be conflated with the view [some] pluralists . . . according to
whom some entities exist1 and others exist2, but none generically exist.
For if no entities generically exist, then it is false that both everything
generically exists and also that an entity’s generically existing is less fun-
2 Which I take to involve at least debates concerning the correct characterization(s) and coherence
of ontological pluralism both generally and specifically.
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damental than (is grounded in) either its existing1 or its existing2. (Mer-
ricks 2019, pp. 599–600)
Defenses against Merricks’s objection to ontological pluralism reveal another di-
mension along which we can generate varieties of ontological pluralism. For example,
David Builes (2019), before presenting his own objection to ontological pluralism,
argues that ontological pluralists can respond to Merricks by appeal to naturalness.
For example, he says that the pluralists which thinks that either exist1 or exist2 ought
to say these ways of existence are perfectly natural, while the generic way of existence
everything enjoys is less natural.
Bradley Rettler goes further to distinguish at least six views on ways of being. He
presents
(WB1) There is only one way to be, and everything that exists exists in
that way.
(WB2) There is only one perfectly natural way to be, and everything that
exists exists in that way; there are other ways of being, but they are less
natural than the one way to be such that everything exists in that way.
(WB3) There are many ways to be, and no way to be is more natural than
any other.
(WB4) There are many ways to be, none of which is more natural than
any other, and one way to be such that everything exists in that way, and
the way to be such that everything exists in that way is less natural than
every other way to be.
(WB5) There are many ways to be and one way to be such that everything
exists in that way, and none of those is more natural than any other.
(WB6) There are no ways to be, or if there are, nothing exists in any of
the ways to be that there are. (Rettler forthcoming, p. 3)
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Additionally, Byron Simmons posits that there are things that enjoy only a generic
way of being. He writes
And there are, I believe, entities that do not seem to enjoy any of these
ways of being. For I accept universalism about composition and thus
believe that there is an entity which is wholly composed of nothing but
Socrates and the number 2. Yet this entity does not strike me as being
either abstract or concrete. It does, however, appear to enjoy generic
existence: the way of being that absolutely everything enjoys (where this
generic way of being is not simply to be understood as a mere disjunction
of the specific ways of being). (Simmons forthcoming, p. 4, emphasis in
original)
With so many ways of ways of being on the table, I propose a characterization
of Ontological Pluralism that (hopefully) captures these various ways of being an
ontological pluralist.3 Let Ontological Pluralism be the view according to which
there are at least two ways of being such that there is no way of being more natural
than them. This characterization is neutral with respect to how many ways of being
there are, what the ways of being are, whether there is a generic way of being, whether
ways of being overlap, whether naturalness comes in degrees, the relative naturalness
of the most natural ways of being, and whether things can lack being.4
3 If I am right, this refutes the claim in Caplan 2011 that unifying characterizations of the varieties
of ontological pluralism are not forthcoming.
4 One might contend that there is an ontological pluralism this definition does not capture. Imagine
that the world is such that “everything is a proper part of something” or, as Jonathan Schaffer
(2010, p. 64) calls it, the world is “junky.” In that case composition continues ‘upward’ so that
there is no object that is not itself a proper part of a greater whole. Further, imagine that
naturalness tracks the complexity of composition and that each object enjoys its own kind of
existence. On this view there are infinitely many ways of being that increase in naturalness as
objects get more complex. The objection is that given that there is always a more natural way
of being, there is always a way of being that falsifies the part of the definition that says “there
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4.1.2 Parthood Pluralism
While ontological pluralism is having what some call a “revival” (Spencer 2012; Turner
2020) or “resurgence” (Bernstein forthcoming), less has been said about parthood
pluralism. Here are some parthood pluralisms that, as above, are either explicitly
defended or gestured toward.5
van Inwagen
In contrast to his ontological monism, Peter van Inwagen is a parthood pluralist. He
writes
There is one relation called ‘parthood’ whose field comprises material
objects . . . There is another relation called ‘parthood’ defined on events,
another still defined on stories, yet another defined on curves, and so
on, through and indefinitely large class of cases. And yet it is no acci-
dent . . . that we apply the same word in each case, for these applications
are bound together by a “unity of analogy.” . . . Many philosophers, if I
is no way of being more natural than them.” I see two ways of replying to this objection.
The first is to deny the plausibility of such a view. After all, it is a combination of views all of
which are themselves controversial (the commitment to a junky world, that each object enjoys
its own way of being, and that naturalness follows compositional complexity). The intuition is
that these taken together are highly implausible. This reply strikes me as unsatisfactory. While
the view might be false (and likely so), it appears to be a coherent view someone could hold.
And it certainly seems like such a view is a variety of ontological pluralism.
Given this, I offer a second reply. The definition claims that “there are at least two ways of
being.” The cardinality of all of the ways of being on this account is surely greater than two (for
it is infinite). For any purported way of being that is said to be more natural than any in the
collection, one can simply point out that it is a member of that collection. Just because there
is always a more natural way of being does not mean that there is a single way of being more
natural than the infinite collection of increasingly more natural ways of being. Thank you to Ben
Caplan for raising this objection.
5 Additionally, see Sider 2007, p. 73 for an argument against parthood pluralism.
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understand them, do not see parthood like that. They see ‘part of’ as
a transcendental or “high-category” predicate—like ‘is identical with’ or
‘three in number’, and unlike ‘rising’—which can be applied to any sort of
object and which always expresses the same very abstract relation. (van
Inwagen 1990, pp. 19–20)
Let Parthood PluralismvI be the view that there is, for each of an “indefinitely
large class of cases,” a parthood relation that objects of that kind stands in, and there
is no general parthood relation that all objects stand in. The passage suggests that
van Inwagen takes the kinds of objects to be mutually exclusive such that objects that
are candidates for standing in one parthood relation are not candidates for standing
in another parthood relation. But, as the discussion of ontological pluralism suggests,
there could be someone who agrees with van Inwagen about the plurality of parthood
relations, but admits of cases of overlap.
McDaniel
After introducing his ontological pluralism (what I have called Ontological PluralismMcD),
McDaniel introduces a corresponding parthood pluralism. He says that part of the
larger ontological view he is defending
will recognize two fundamentally different kinds of part-whole relations:
a non-indexed part-whole relation that is restricted to the category of
spacetime regions and a spatiotemporally relativized part-whole relation
that is restricted to the category of material occupants. In other words,
the part-whole relation defined on the category of material objects is such
that, for any region of spacetime R, it makes sense to ask of two objects
x and y whether x is a part of y relative to R. . . . One way of being
a compositional [or parthood] pluralist is to claim that each ontological
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category has its own parthood relation. According to this way of being a
compositional [or parthood] pluralist, the relation of part to whole that
obtains between, e.g., regions of space is not the same relation as the
relation of part to whole that obtains between material objects. Moreover,
according to this form of compositional [or parthood] pluralism, it makes
no sense to say that there is a whole composed of objects from distinct
ontological categories. So, for example, there is no object made out of my
car and the region of space that it exactly occupies. (McDaniel 2004, pp.
140–2)6
McDaniel seems to follow van Inwagen’s strategy of making the particular part-
hood relations exclusive to each ontological kind. Let Parthood PluralismMcD be the
view that there is a parthood relation, relativized to space-time regions, that holds
between material objects and another parthood relation, unrelativized, that holds
between space-time regions.
Gilmore
Cody Gilmore has argued that parthood is neither the two-place relation it is ordi-
narily thought to be, nor, like McDaniel’s parthood relation with respect to material
objects, a three-place relation. Rather, he has argued that parthood is a four-place
relation. He defines his view as follows
Four-Place Parthood (4P): Parthoodm is a four-place relation that can be
expressed by the predicate ‘x at w is a partm of y at z’.
6 While McDaniel calls the view compositional pluralism, here he defines it in terms of the part-
hood relation. Perhaps someone has reason to think that composition is in an important sense
metaphysically prior to parthood and would thus be a compositional pluralist who would take
issue with conflating compositional pluralism with parthood pluralism. I do not adjudicate such
a disagreement here and assume either that compositional and parthood pluralism are the same
view or that whatever considerations there are in favor of one are considerations in favor of the
other.
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It will be natural . . . for friends of 4P to say that parthoodm has one slot
for a part, a second slot for a location of that part (e.g., a spacetime
region), a third slot for a whole, and a fourth slot for a location of that
whole (e.g., a spacetime region). (Gilmore 2009, p. 84, emphasis original)
Here, Gilmore assumes parthood monism and symbolizes the assumption by call-
ing the parthood relation “parthoodm” (Gilmore 2009, p. 83). Here he means to
defend the claim that his four-place parthood relation is the fundamental parthood
relation that material objects stand in. However, he has argued, while assuming part-
hood monism, that his four-place parthood relation is also what the constituents of
a proposition stand in to propositions (Gilmore 2014).
One might, as I do below, raise worries about Gilmore’s assumption of parthood
monism. We can imagine someone who agrees with the reasons that Gilmore gives for
thinking that the parthood relation that material objects stand in is his four-place
parthood relation, but think there are other parthood relations that other objects
stand in. That is one might be a parthood pluralist by siding with Gilmore on the
adicity of a parthood relation, but depart with his assumption that it is the parthood
relation.
4.1.3 Identity Pluralism
While some has been said about ontological pluralism and less about parthood plu-
ralism recently, even less has been said about identity pluralism. In fact, I suspect
that the use of identity monism in arguments against kinds of pluralism is evidence
of how widely identity monism is assumed.
Consider part of Ted Sider’s argument for parthood monism. In an effort to draw
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lessons from the link between composition and identity, without joining Composition
as Identity theorists in saying the relations are the same, he argues from identity
monism to parthood monism. He writes that
a single notion of identity applies to objects of diverse ontological cate-
gories (to both concrete and abstract objects, for instance). Nails and
numbers are self-identical in the same sense. Likewise, a single notion of
some-of applies across ontological categories. So if we are trying to cleave
as much as possible to the intuitive ideas that a part is just some of a
whole and that the whole just is the parts, a single notion of parthood
should also apply to diverse ontological categories. (Sider 2007, p. 73)
This argument is persuasive only to those who suppose identity monism, and, on
my reading, assumes that many people think identity monism is obviously true.
In what follows I attempt to carve out logical space for an identity pluralism. Let
Identity PluralismdA be the view that there are two identity relations, one holding
between concreta and the other between abstracta, such that while there is a generic
identity relation it is not more natural than these two.
4.2 Testing for Pluralism
Having staked out a possible version of Identity Pluralism, Identity PluralismdA, I
will now see what, if any, reasons there might be to adopt it. First, I review tests
for pluralism that have been proposed by McDaniel. I apply them to parthood to
show how one might arrive at parthood pluralism. Then I return to identity to give
examples of why one might have reasons to adopt Identity PluralismdA or some other
version of Identity Pluralism like it.
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4.2.1 McDaniel’s Naturalness Test
In debates over whether one ought to be a Monist or Pluralist with respect to a
metaphysical concept, there arises the question of what evidence counts in favor of
Monism or Pluralism. Specifically when the received view is Monism, the question
arises: what evidence counts in favor of Pluralism? In defending his Ontological
PluralismMcD, McDaniel (2017, chap. 2, §3) has argued that there are two cases in
which Pluralism is preferable to Monism.
I will talk about these cases as tests that provide evidence for Pluralism. For
metaphysical concept C, the general form of these tests is “on the assumption there
is a topic-neutral C, if C has feature F, then there is evidence that Pluralism about
C is true.”7
The first qualification attempts to avoid an obfuscation of McDaniel’s account. If
Pluralism about C is true, then it is an open question whether or not C has F. The
reason is that it might only seem as if C has F if it turns out that there is no general
C, just the specific Cs. For example, as we have seen above, someone might claim
that the general form of existence has F and that this is evidence for Ontological
Pluralism. But another Ontological Pluralist might argue that, in virtue of there
being no general form of existence, it only seems as if existence has F. On that view,
F disappears when one adopts Ontological Pluralism.
Given this, I take “evidence for pluralism” talk as describing the theoretical choice
a metaphysician faces when it appears that, by assuming there is a topic-neutral C,
7 I follow McDaniel’s proposal that the relevant features in question are those that provide evidence
against the naturalness of a metaphysical concept. One could argue for pluralism on grounds
other than naturalism though. See Caplan 2011, §4 for a discussion of routes to pluralism other
than naturalness.
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C has feature F. The question the metaphysician faces is “is Monism about C true, or
is Pluralism (either a version that retains the topic-neutral C or one that eliminates
it) with respect to C true?”8
In what follows, I will talk about McDaniel providing tests for pluralism and mean
that in the methodological frame just described.
4.2.2 McDaniel’s Tests
Is Inside Of
To illustrate McDaniel’s tests, let us start with a somewhat contrived example regard-
ing a relation. There might be good reasons to think that the relation in question does
not actually hold for some of the objects in the example, but it should help illustrate
how the tests work. Think of the relation is inside of. Because the relation is tightly
bound with facts about objects’ locations and the spaces that they occupy, we can
imagine a variety of inferences that we are allowed to draw from the instantiation of
the relation or lack thereof. For example, if A is inside of B, then we can infer that A
occupies some space (at least loosely speaking) that B occupies. Or, if A is inside of
B, then we can infer that A is wherever (at least loosely speaking) B is. Let us give
the latter principle a name and definition. Where IO is the is inside of relation and
AL is the is at the location of relation,
Follows ∀x∀y(xIOy → xALy)
Something else we might notice about the relation is that it holds between two
objects. There is the object that is inside and the object that is being, in some sense,
8 Thank you to an anonymous referee for helpful comments about this.
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occupied. That is, the relation has an adicity of two. As a general matter, there
are relations between more than two objects. Additionally, relations between objects
might require require some parameter or index to fully capture their instantiation.
At first glance, is inside of does not appear to be that sort of relation.
However, we can imagine a set of objects with respect to which the is inside of
relation starts to behave differently than we might have first thought. Think of the
file system on a modern operating system. One way of organizing the data stored
on a computer is to use a file-folder structure. The structure uses the metaphor of a
physical filling system.9 Just as some organizational schemes are such that physical
documents are located inside of physical file folders, files on a computer are located
inside of folders on a hard drive. So it appears that files on a computer drive can
bear the is inside of relation to folders on the drive.
But this relation behaves differently with respect to computer files and folders
than it does with respect to physical objects.10 For example, we cannot draw the
same inferences about objects with respect to their locations. There is some sense in
which being inside a folder means that a file is located wherever the folder is. That
is, within the computer’s user interface, files appear to be wherever the folders they
are inside of are. But, in a strict sense, being inside a computer folder does not imply
the occupation of that space. In fact computer files and folders are 1s and 0s11 on a
physical hard drive. It is not as if some sets of 1s and 0s are, as they exist on the
9 Resistance to the contrivance of the example that was alluded to above likely comes from the
fact that this system relies on a metaphor.
10 Or perhaps more carefully, than it does to ordinary physical objects.
11 Or more accurately, representations of 1s and 0s.
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hard drive, located inside of another set of 1s and 0s. Although it might be that
actual instances of these file systems are such that the sets of 1s and 0s are physically
nearby, they do not necessarily need to be. A file could exist miles away from the
folder in which it is located.
Moreover, because of the fact that this structure is instantiated in a complex
database, which folder a particular file is inside of could depend on something other
than the file and the folders in question. What I mean is that we can imagine two
organizational schemes for a hard drive, say S∗ and S∗∗, such that the same file under
scheme S∗ is inside of a different folder than it is under scheme S∗∗. Although this
might not happen in practice, it could be the case that is inside of with respect to
files and folders on a computer is actually a three-place relation. That is, it might
be that the way that files are inside of folders is best described as the is inside of
relation holding between the file, the folder, and an organizational scheme. So what
we thought was strictly a two-place relation above might be a three-place relation in
some circumstances.
At this stage the fact that the is inside of relation holds between files and folders
because it was constructed from a metaphor might be enough for us to think either
that the relation does not actually hold or that we are actually talking about a
different relation entirely. As far as the example goes, this might be right. However,
the example illustrates the two tests McDaniel presents for evidence of pluralism.
When we observe that the is inside of relation follows different principles with
respect to different kinds of objects, this, according to McDaniel (2017, p. 58) means
that the relation is systematically variably axiomatic. While with respect to ordinary
objects, is inside of appears to obey Follows; with respect to computer files and
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folders it does not.
It is not just that the relation obeys some principles and not others; rather, it is
that the difference tracks differences in the relata. When ordinary physical objects
stand in the is inside of relation, there are certain principles that the relation obeys.
But when the objects standing in the relation are these computer files and folders,
the principles change. Since the difference is tied to the objects being related, the
axioms associated with the is inside of relation vary systematically.
This, according to McDaniel, is evidence that the topic-neutral relation is inside
of is not perfectly natural. He writes that being systematically variably axiomatic
is a bad way for a perfectly natural relation to behave: its behavior looks
disjunctive at worst, less than uniform at best. (McDaniel 2010b, p. 700)
And he suggests that this behavior serves as evidence that the relation is not in fact
perfectly natural.
Relatedly, with respect to ordinary objects, the is inside of relation is assumed
to be a two-place relation. There is not some third object needed to instantiate
the relation, nor is there a need for some parameter or index. But the example of
computer files and folders shows that this is not necessarily the case with different
kinds of objects. Although is inside of might be two-place in these cases, it could
be three-place. If it was, then the relation would be, according to McDaniel (2017,
p. 57), systematically variably polyadic. The difference in the relation’s adicity is due
to the difference in the relata. The possibility that the is inside of relation might be
three-place arises only when the objects are computer files and folders.
Like systematic variable axiomaticity, systematic variable adicity is, according to
McDaniel, evidence that a relation is not perfectly natural. He writes
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I am not necessarily suspicious of variably polyadic natural relations in
general. Rather, the thought is this: when you have a highly topic-neutral
feature that behaves in a fundamentally different way when applied to
objects from different ontological categories, but behaves uniformly within
single ontological categories, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the
more natural features are the topic-specific features defined on individual
categories. (McDaniel 2010b, p. 699)
To generalize, I take McDaniel to be providing tests for naturalness. Let us call
these the Variably Axiomatic Test and the Variably Polyadic Test. Where C is a
metaphysical concept (like a property, relation, or existence itself),
Variably Axiomatic Test If C is systematically variably axiomatic, then this counts
as evidence against C’s naturalness.
Variably Polyadic Test If C is systematically variably polyadic, then this counts
as evidence against C’s naturalness.
The step toward Pluralism requires the existence of more natural, topic-specific
versions of C. I take it that the evidence against C’s naturalness is also evidence
in favor of the existence of topic-specific versions of C that are more natural than
C. This, together with the broad characterization of Pluralism, counts as evidence
for pluralism. Let us call these steps More Natural Specifications and Evidence for
Pluralism, respectively. Where C′ and C′′ are topic-specific versions of the topic
neutral C,
More Natural Specifications If there is evidence, from either the Variably Ax-
iomatic Test or the Variably Polyadic Test, against the naturalness of C, then
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there is evidence in favor of the existence of at least C′ and C′′ such that C′ and
C′′ are topic-specific versions of C that are more natural than C.
Evidence for Pluralism If C′ and C′′ are more natural than C, then this is evidence
for pluralism with respect to C.
I illustrate these tests with respect to parthood in the next section.
4.2.3 Testing for Parthood Pluralism
In this section I apply McDaniel’s tests for naturalness to Gilmore’s theory of part-
hood. Recall from subsubsection 4.1.2 that Gilmore thinks that Parthood Monism
is true and that the parthood relation is four-place. Specifically, he thinks that the
relation holds between a part, the location of that part, a whole, and the location of
that whole.
Assume that Gilmore is right about parthood with respect to concrete composite
objects. That is, for concrete composite objects, such objects have parts if and only
if the parthood relation holds between each of its parts, the location of that part, the
whole, and the location of the whole. Further, suppose that the following principle
about parthood and locations hold. Where L is the property is a location, and P is
Gilmore’s four-place parthood relation,
Location of Location Parts ∀x∀x1∀y∀y1(Lx ∧ P (x, x1, y, y1)→ x = x1)
That is, if a location ever stands in the parthood relation as a part to some whole,
then its location as a part is itself. This follows from what I take to be the plausible
assumption that locations, if they are ever located, are located only at themselves.
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If, on Gilmore’s parthood relation, locations are parts of wholes, then they stand in
the parthood relation at locations.
However, there are circumstances when, on Gilmore’s own theory, Location of Lo-
cation Parts fails. According to Gilmore (2014), propositions have their constituents
as parts and the locations of propositions and their parts are at non-spatiotemporal
slots. For any location there are doubtless propositions concerning it. So, each lo-
cation is such that it is a part of countless propositions. But the locations at which
locations are parts of propositions are slots. While slots are locations, when locations
are located at slots, they are then located at a place distinct from themselves. This
is easy to see in the case of spatiotemporal locations. When located at themselves,
they are at a place in space and time, not at a slot in a proposition. So when located
at a slot, they are at a location distinct from themselves. It is less obvious in the
case of slots themselves. While we might be able to construct propositions where the
slots that are constituents of the propositions are at themselves, this is not always
the case.12 Say the particular slot we are talking about is the slot for a particular
property F. Whenever we say that slot has or does not have properties other than F,
the slot, as a constituent of that proposition, is a located at a different slot. So, when
the composite objects are propositions, Location of Location Parts fails.
I do not intend the argument to be decisive. Rather, it demonstrates what one
might take as evidence for Parthood Pluralism. If Location of Location Parts is true
with respect to concrete composites, but not with respect to propositions, then this
provides, via the Variably Axiomatic Test, evidence against the naturalness of the
topic-neutral parthood relation. From More Natural Specifications, this is evidence
12 I am even skeptical of the existence of a such a proposition.
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that there is a more natural parthood relation for concrete objects and another more
natural parthood relation for propositions. By Evidence for Pluralism, this is evidence
for Parthood Pluralism.
4.2.4 Testing for Identity Pluralism
Now we turn to identity. Here are some reasons, given McDaniel’s tests for natural-
ness, that one might that think Identity Pluralism is true.
Contingent Identity
Here is an argument that, if Contingent Identity were true, then there would be
evidence for Identity Pluralism.
Necessity of Identity is the principle that says that, for all objects, if those objects
are identical, then they are necessarily identical. Contingent Identity is the view that
says that Necessity of Identity is false.
1. Assume that Contingent Identity is true.
2. From 1, possibly some objects are such that, if they are identical, then they
could be distinct.
3. There are some kinds of objects that are identical could not be distinct.
4. From 1–3, if Contingent Identity is true, then the identity relation is systemat-
ically variably axiomatic.
5. From the Variably Axiomatic Test and 4, there is evidence against the natural-
ness of the identity relation.
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6. From More Natural Specifications and 5, there are topic-specific identity rela-
tions that are more natural than the topic-neutral identity relation.
7. From 6 and Evidence for Pluralism, there is evidence for Identity Pluralism.
Assuming that Contingent Identity is true, 2 is true. Contingent Identity is just
the claim that there are some objects such that it is possible that they are identical,
but might have been distinct. For a purported case of Contingent Identity recall
Goliath and Lump1 from Chapter 1, §1.5.2. There is reason to think that Goliath
and Lump1 are actually identical, but because Lump1 might survive in circumstances
that would destroy Goliath, there is reason to think that they could be distinct.
Here is the argument for 3. Assume that Contingent Identity is true. Let W be
the actual world. Assume for reductio that numbers A and B are identical in W but
could have been distinct in some world W ′. By Leibniz’s Law, this means that, in
world W , A and B have all the same properties. And, by Leibniz’s Law, in world W ′
A differs from B with respect to some property. From this, in the actual world W ,
A and B have all the same properties but could possibly differ in their properties in
virtue of having different properties in W ′.
One reason to reject the assumption that numbers A and B are contingently iden-
tical is thinking that numbers cannot have their intrinsic properties contingently.13
Even if it is true that some objects are such that they have their intrinsic properties
contingently, it would be surprising if numbers were such objects. What would it
mean for a number to have properties contingently? Let us consider mathematical
properties of numbers. Assume A is such that it is evenly divisible by 3. It seems
13 Extrinsic properties are discussed below.
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implausible for A to actually be divisible by 3 but not divisible by 3 in another world
in which it exists. I assume that this generalizes for many mathematical properties.
But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that there is some mathematical
property P that A has in the actual world but that it does not have in W ′. Could
it be the case that B, which is identical to A in W , has P in W , but unlike A, still
has P in W ′? One could argue that the following cannot all be true: (i) A and B are
identical in the actual world, (ii) in virtue of that identity, A and B have the same
contingent mathematical property P, and (iii) it is the case that, in some world W ′,
B still has the property P, while A does not have the property P.
But perhaps the property on which they possibly differ is, not P, but some non-
mathematical property. What non-mathematical properties might numbers have that
differ across worlds? A plausible candidate seems to be extrinsic properties that they
have in virtue of their relation objects that are not themselves numbers. Perhaps A
and B have the property is the cardinality of the set of Justices on the United States
Supreme Court.14 Let us call this property Q. Q is had by numbers contingently.
Barring some stringent views on the identity of the Supreme Court across possible
worlds, this property could be had by numbers other than the one that actually has
it. In fact, different numbers have had it in the actual world.
So it seems that there are some properties that numbers have but might not have
had. Could A and B possibly differ with respect to non-mathematical properties like
Q? For this to be the case, we have to imagine that (i) A and B are identical in
14 Or more carefully, the set of Justices presently serving on the United States Supreme Court. See
Uzquiano 2004 for reasons to think that the Supreme Court is not identical to this set of Justices.
I assume that we can talk about sets whose membership is dynamic, but if not, I assume that
there are properties related to cardinalities that are dynamic that would be suitable substitutes
in the example.
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the actual world, (ii) in virtue of that identity, A and B have the same contingent
non-mathematical property Q, and (iii) it be the case that, in some world W ′, B still
has the property Q, while A does not have the property Q. As with mathematical
properties, one could argue that (i)–(iii) cannot all be true, even with respect to
non-mathematical properties.
Therefore, even if Contingent Identity is true, there are some objects, namely
numbers, such that, if they are identical, then they could not be distinct.
If 2–4 are true on the assumption that Contingent Identity is true, then if Contin-
gent Identity is true, there is evidence, from the Variably Axiomatic Test, against the
naturalness of the identity relation (line 5). Applying More Natural Specifications
(line 6) and Evidence for Pluralism, there is evidence for Identity Pluralism (line 7).
As with the argument for Parthood Pluralism, I do not present the argument
as decisive. Rather, it demonstrates what one might take as evidence for Identity
Pluralism. It seems that one has reasons to think that Necessity of Identity might be
true of some objects, but not of others (that is, that Contingent Identity is true, but
only in for some objects). Applying tests suggested by McDaniel, these reasons could
serve as evidence for Identity Pluralism. Additionally, this could serve as part of a
larger argument for Identity PluralismdA. If one could show that the reasons to think
that numbers cannot be contingently identical apply to abstracta more generally, then
the general form of the argument could provide evidence for Identity PluralismdA.
Indeterminate Identity
Here is the argument that, if Indeterminate Identity is true, then there is evidence
for Identity Pluralism:
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1. Assume that Indeterminate Identity is true.
2. From 1, possibly some objects are such that it is indeterminate that they are
identical.
3. There are some kinds of objects such that they cannot be indeterminately iden-
tical to anything.
4. From 1–3, if Indeterminate Identity is true, then the identity relation is system-
atically variably axiomatic.
5. From the Variably Axiomatic Test and 4, there is evidence against the natural-
ness of the identity relation.
6. From More Natural Specifications and 5, there are topic-specific identity rela-
tions that are more natural than the topic-neutral identity relation.
7. From 6 and Evidence for Pluralism, there is evidence for Identity Pluralism.
Assuming that Indeterminate Identity is true, 2 is true. Indeterminate Identity
just is the claim that there are some objects such that it it indeterminate that they
are identical. For example a purported case of Indeterminate Identity, recall the Ship
of Theseus from Chapter 1, §1.5.1. Parsons’s solution to the puzzle is to say both
that Original Ship is indeterminately identical to Replacement Ship and that
Original Ship is indeterminately identical to Reassembly Ship.
Here is an argument for 3. Someone might think that, while the world of the
concrete might admit of the indeterminacy that makes it possible for objects to be
indeterminately identical to other objects, the world of the abstract resists this inde-
terminacy. Such a person might be Russell. He writes that
127
the world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of
being. The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the
mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all
who love perfection more than life. The world of existence is fleeting,
vague, without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement.
(Russell 1912/2001, p. 57)
Someone could adopt Russell’s distinction between the world of the abstract and the
world of the concrete to argue that it is only objects “without sharp boundaries”
(namely, concrete objects), and never the “exact” objects (namely, the abstract ob-
jects), that might ever be indeterminately identical.
Some have argued that there are vague abstracta, which are vague in virtue of
having vague properties, like vague locations.15 Even if we admit vague abstracta
in this sense, one might still think that abstract objects are never indeterminately
identical to anything.
What would it mean for abstract objects to be indeterminately identical? We
know from the version of Leibniz’s Law accepted by Indeterminate Identity theorists
that indeterminately identical objects must be such that it can be indeterminate of
them that they have a property. But, what is more, it must be the case that it
is indeterminate of one of these abstract objects that it has a particular property
that the other either determinately has or determinately lacks. One might think
that, even if we encounter abstracta such that it is indeterminate that they have a
particular property, it is unlikely that there would be an abstract object having all of
the other properties but determinately having or determinately lacking that particular
property. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 3, Indeterminate Identity is advanced as a
15 See, for example, Goodman 2003, 2007.
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theory to explain puzzle cases. Even those who argue that abstracta can have vague
properties admit that these sort of puzzles do not seem to be prevalent for abstracta.
For example, Jeffrey Goodman says
it is not obvious how one would construct a sorites paradox appealing
to [abstract] entities such as fictional characters, sets of concreta, teams
and their locations in the way that it is obvious how to construct such
a paradox when making an appeal to grains of sand and heap-formation
or hairs on heads and baldness; the locations of such entities likewise do
not seem to obviously admit of borderline cases in the way that there are
borderline cases of heaps and bald people. (Goodman 2007, p. 91)
Therefore, even if Indeterminate Identity is true, one might think that there are some
objects, namely abstracta, such that they could never be indeterminately identical to
anything.
If 2–4 are true on the assumption that Indeterminate Identity is true, then if
Indeterminate Identity is true, there is evidence, from the Variably Axiomatic Test,
against the naturalness of the identity relation (line 5). Applying More Natural Spec-
ifications (line 6) and Evidence for Pluralism, there is evidence for Identity Pluralism
(line 7).
As above, I do not present the argument as decisive. Rather, it demonstrates what
one might take as evidence for Identity Pluralism. It seems that one has reasons to
think that Determinacy of Identity might be true of some kinds of objects, but not
others (that is, that Indeterminate Identity is true of some kinds of objects and not
others). Applying tests suggested by McDaniel, these reasons could serve as evidence
for Identity Pluralism. Additionally, this could serve as an additional part of a larger
argument for Identity PluralismdA.
129
Composition as Identity
Recently, some have argued that the composition and identity relations are impor-
tantly similar.16 The intuition driving the view is that a complex whole is, in some
sense, “nothing over and above its parts” (Lewis 1991, p. 80).17 The strong version
of this view is that the identity relation is the composition relation.
On this view, the identity relation does not merely relate single objects together;
rather, it also relates pluralities to single objects. That is, the identity relation can
hold between a collection of objects (pluralities) and a single object.18 While this
might seem unintuitive, defenders have offered that the parts of a whole are seen as
pluralities only under particular conceptualizations (Bøhn 2009) or partitions (Cot-
noir 2013) of reality, while under different ones they are seen as a single object.
On the assumption that composition just is identity, we should ask, as we have
with Contingent Identity and Indeterminate Identity above, if the relation behaves
differently for different categories of objects. If so, then this is evidence for Identity
Pluralism
Here is the argument that, if Composition as Identity is true, then there is evidence
16 See Wallace 2011a,b for an overview of the view and Cotnoir and Baxter 2014 for recent discussion.
17 See, for example, Sider 2015 and Smid 2017 for discussion of this phrase, which van Inwagen
(1994, p. 210) calls “slippery.”
18 More controversially, Donald Baxter (1988, 2014) has argued that the identity relation holds
between individual parts and a whole. For example, he argues that in the case of Six Pack,
an individual bottle is, in some sense, identical to the whole six pack. Here, I assume that
Composition as Identity is the view that pluralities can be collectively identical to single objects,
but not the view that parts are individually or distributively identical to a whole. Moreover,
I ignore the question of whether pluralities stand in the identity relation to pluralities. One
possibility is that that pluralities stand in the identity relation to pluralities. Another is that
pluralities stand in an identity relation to pluralities. Additionally, there is the further question
about the naturalness of that identity relation.
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for Identity Pluralism:
1. Assume Composition as Identity is true.
2. From 1, when some objects stand in the composition relation to an object, those
objects are collectively identical to that object.19
3. There are some kinds of objects such that, when they stand in the composition
relation to an object, those objects are not collectively identical to that object.
4. From 1–3, if Composition as Identity is true, then the identity relation is sys-
tematically variably axiomatic.
5. From the Variably Axiomatic Test and 4, there is evidence against the natural-
ness of the identity relation.
6. From More Natural Specifications and 5, there are topic-specific identity rela-
tions that are more natural than the topic-neutral identity relation.
7. From 6 and Pluralism, there is evidence for Identity Pluralism.
Assuming that Composition as Identity is true, 2 is true. Composition as Identity
just is the claim that the composition relation is the identity relation. Recall the cases
of Parcels and Six Pack from Chapter 1, §1.5.2 for motivation for Composition
as Identity. In those cases, proponents of Composition as Identity argue that the
individual parcels of land are collectively identical to the single parcel that they
compose and that the individual bottles are collectively identical to the single six
pack that they compose.
19 See footnote 18 for the distinction between collective and individual (or distributive) identity.
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Here is a reason to think 3 is true.
Consider the principle Uniqueness of Composition, which David Lewis (1991, p.
74) defines as the claim that “it never happens that the same things have two different
fusions.”20 Uniqueness of Composition seems to follow from the strong version of
Composition as Identity. This is because, whenever the same collection of objects
compose, they are identical to what they compose. So it can never be the case that
the same objects compose two different things.
But it seems that some abstract objects are such that there are distinct composite
objects composed of exactly the same parts. For example, distinct complex properties
might be made up of the same parts arranged differently. The complex property is
green but is not round seems to have the same parts as the property is round but
is not green, but these properties are not identical. Not only are their intensions
different, but their actual extensions are different.
Similarly, distinct propositions can be made up of the exact same constituents.
The proposition that arabica coffee is better than robusta coffee seems to have the
same parts as the proposition that robusta coffee is better than arabica coffee. How-
ever those propositions are distinct. They mean different things and, in the opinion
of many, the former is true and the latter is false.
This suggests that if composition is identity (the strong version of Composition as
Identity), then it might be that Uniqueness of Composition is a principle that varies
with respect to kinds of objects. Perhaps it is true only of concrete objects, but not
20 Fusions, as defined by Lewis, are the wholes to which parts collectively stand in the composition
relation. He defines something as “a fusion of some things iff it has all of them as parts and has
no part that is distinct from each of them,” where by “distinct” he does not mean non-identity,
but rather disjoint. That is having no overlap (Lewis 1991, p. 73).
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of abstract objects.
Further, it suggests that, at least for certain abstract objects, composition cannot
be identity. On the assumption that Composition as Identity theorists think some
formulation of Transitivity of Identity is true, then it cannot be the case that, with
respect to some abstract objects, the same parts compose distinct wholes. This is
because, on the strong version of Composition as Identity, the parts are collectively
identical to two distinct things. But by transitivity and symmetry, those distinct
things are identical.
Someone might argue that while not strictly passing the Variably Axiomatic Test,
there is a way in which, assuming the strong version of Composition as Identity is
true, the topic-neutral identity relation exhibits systematic variable behavior with
respect to an axiom.
Some have argued that the composition does not hold across concrete and abstract
objects such that there are objects with at least one concrete part and at least one
abstract part. Of the view that says that any objects whatsoever compose, Peter van
Inwagen says
According to [such a view], for example, if there are such things as the
color blue and the key of C-sharp and I, then there is an object that has
the color blue and the key of C-sharp and me as parts. I do not understand
[such a view] because, though I think that the color blue and the key of
C-Sharp and I all exist, I am unable to conceive of an object that has
these three rather diverse things as parts. (van Inwagen 1994, p. 74)
Similarly, Peter Simons objects to such objects, which he calls “transcategorial
sums.” He says, “a transcategorial sum is odd because it has parts in different cate-
gories, so either it itself belongs to one of these categories, or it does not.” He goes
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on to say that it is arbitrary to which category such an object belongs (Simons 2003,
p. 237).
Lorraine Keller echos this worry by writing
One problem with transcategorial sums is that it is not clear what cate-
gory they belong to: does the sum of an abstract object and a concrete
particular belong to the category abstract object or concrete particular
(or, more plausibly, neither)? (Keller 2014, p. 662)
Even we take seriously the claim that there are no transcategorial sums, that does
not mean that composition cannot be identity restricted to ontological categories.
To explain, consider the strong version of Composition as Identity formulated as a
principle with universal quantification where C is the composition relation:
Composition as Identity ∀xx∀y(xxCy ↔ xx = y)
If van Inwagen, Simons, and Keller are right, then the quantifiers cannot range
over both abstract and concrete objects. However, their worries do not rule out the
possibility that the principle is true when the quantification is restricted to ontological
categories. That is, it could be true of concrete objects that a plurality composes a
whole if and only if they are collectively identical to the whole. And it could be true of
abstract objects that a plurality composes a whole if and only if they are collectively
identical to the whole. The above worries only rule out the principle being true when
the quantifiers are, so to speak, wide open with respect to ontological categories.21
21 It could be argued that an unrestricted formulation of Composition as Identity could be
true even if there are no transcategorial sums. This would be done by conditionalizing the
principle to pluralities that are either concrete or abstract. Here is such a formulation:
∀xx∀y[(Concrete(xx) ∨ Abstract(yy)) → (xxCy ↔ xx = y)]. I think the right response to
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To me, this seems like systematically variable behavior similar to what McDaniel
called systematically variably axiomatic behavior. However, it is not the case that
the principle is true with respect to some kinds of objects and false with respect to
other kinds of objects. Instead, the principle is true with respect to kinds of objects
in a restricted sense, but not unrestricted across all objects.22
I propose that we call this feature systematic axiomatic restriction. A meta-
physical concept C is said to be systematically axiomatically restricted when axioms
regarding C are true when their application is restricted to kinds of objects, but false
when unrestricted. We can then add another test of naturalness of a metaphysical
concept.
Variably Restricted Test If C is systematically axiomatically restricted, then this
counts as evidence against C’s naturalness.
However, it should be noted that those who oppose transcategorial sums might,
if they were Composition as Identity theorists, have reason to think that identity is
systematically variably axiomatic. That is, they might think that there are principles
that are true with respect to some kinds of objects and not others. For example,
Keller goes on to say
There are other mereological problems generated by transcategorial sums,
however. Cosider the mereological principle Theodore Sider calls ‘inheri-
this proposal is to point out that such conditionalizations are actually evidence of a topic-neutral
principle behaving differently for different kinds of objects specified in the conditional. Addition-
ally, such conditionalizations could be used to reformulate topic-neutral principles so they yield
different verdicts on McDaniel’s own tests. If such a reformulation is a problem for the test I
am proposing here, then it is a problem for McDaniel’s tests too. Thank you to Ben Caplan for
raising this point.
22 Thank you to Ben Caplan for suggesting this possibility.
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tance of location’, according to which ‘an object is located wherever any
of its parts are located‘ (2007, 2, 20). According to inheritance of location,
the proposition John runs is located wherever John is. But since John
changes location, the proposition changes location as well. So acceptance
of this uncontroversial principle has the absurd consequence that some
propositions move. (Keller 2014, p. 663, italics in the original)
As above, I do not present the argument as decisive. Rather, it demonstrates what
one might take as evidence for Identity Pluralism. It seems that one has reasons to
think that One-to-Oneness of Identity might be true of some kinds of objects, but
not others (that is, that Composition as Identity is true of some kinds of objects and
not others). Applying the new test I, inspired by McDaniel’s tests, have proposed,
these reasons could serve as evidence for Identity Pluralism. Additionally, this could
serve as an additional part of a larger argument for Identity PluralismdA.
4.2.5 A New Test
Another upshot of the previous subsection is that those who adopt Non-Standard
View of Identity have reasons to adopt Identity Pluralism. I suggest a further result.
Considerations about how identity possibly behaves in these metaphysical theories
tells us something about the abstract–concrete distinction as well as identity.
The reason that identity varies with respect to abstract and concrete objects is
not explained by how the Non-Standard View of Identity departed from the Standard
View of Identity. One view said identity was contingent, one said it was indetermi-
nate, and another claimed it was identical to composition. What these views have
in common is that they deny one of the Metaphysical Principles of Identity. But
the possibility that, on each view, Identity Pluralism is true is not explained by
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this shared feature. The common feature in each’s plausible path to pluralism is
the concrete–abstract divide. This suggests that a topic-neutral identity relation’s
possible unnaturalness is explained by the ontological divide between abstracta and
concreta.
That the topic-neutral identity relation might behave differently for abstracta
and concreta independent of which Metaphysical Principles of Identity are true of
it suggests that the possibility of a metaphysical concept behaving differently with
respect to kinds of objects is another source of evidence of unnaturalness. In light of
this suggestion, I propose to add a new test for pluralism. Where C is a metaphysical
concept (like a property or relation, or existence itself),
Possible Variable Behavior If C is possibly either systematically variably ax-
iomatic, systematically variably polyadic, or systematically axiomatically re-
stricted, then this counts as evidence against C’s naturalness.
If, like the tests above, this test serves as a guide to the naturalness of metaphysical
concepts, then one could use the arguments sketched in subsection 4.2.4 and others like
it, to defend a pluralism like Identity PluralismdA where there are distinct identity
relations for abstracta and concreta and those relations are more natural than a
general identity relation.
4.3 Conclusion
I have advanced the discussion of pluralism in two directions. First, I have proposed
two new tests for pluralism to add to McDaniel’s. Second, I have proposed kinds of
arguments one might give to defend Identity Pluralism.
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